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ZOYA'S STANDING PROBLEM, OR,
WHEN SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION
FOLLOW THE FLAG?
Jeffrey Kahn*
Some federal courts have devised a new test of prudential standing
that they use to dismiss suits filed by foreign plaintiffs alleging un-
lawful conduct by American officials abroad, even when these cases
involve matters that may have nothing to do with foreign affairs,
national security, or terrorism. Rather than decide the case on its
merits or dismiss it on any number of legitimate grounds, the com-
plaint is dismissed because the plaintiff lacks a "prior substantial
connection" to the United States.
I identify and critique this strange but proliferating test of standing.
First, it is inconsistent with any theoretical view of the Constitu-
tion's extraterritorial application, including the functional one
recently advanced in Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark habeas corpus decision. Second, it advances
none of the policy interests that prudential standing was created to
promote. The test has been wrenched from its origins as an ap-
proach to decide the merits of a constitutional question; it is now
used to decide jurisdiction. This impedes the development of an im-
portant area of case law while abdicating the judicial role in
defining the limits of state power
The Article begins with an in-depth case study (based on interviews
and primary sources) of a takings claim that would have been un-
exceptional but for its foreign location and rather shocking
allegations against the United States. I repeatedly reference this
case while examining the theoretical and practical inconsistencies
of dismissing "Zoya's case" not because the courts found fault with
her claim, but because she lacked a prior substantial connection to
the United States.
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"The Constitution begins with 'We, the People.' Where does it end?"
-Gerald L. Neuman'
INTRODUCTION
Should foreign plaintiffs in faraway lands at peace with the United
States have standing in federal court to pursue constitutional claims against
American officials abroad? Consider a concrete example:
Zoya, a citizen of Uzbekistan, owned a caf6 next to the U.S. Embassy in
that country. She alleges that American officials conspired with Uzbek au-
thorities to knock down her caf6 and build a security checkpoint in its
place. Zoya sues the United States in its Court of Federal Claims seeking
compensation for the destruction of her property.
What should the court hold with respect to whether Zoya has a valid legal
claim? This straightforward claim, alleging a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause, turns out to be a Rorschach test for how one views
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.
1. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 910 (1991).
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It is easy to conjure alternative holdings based on different views of the
Constitution. Where one believes the Constitution "ends" is a function of
where one believes the discussion about its limits should start. Some judges,
viewing the Constitution as a limit on government power wherever exer-
cised, would permit discovery and decide the factual merits of Zoya's claim.
Other judges, believing that the Constitution governs only a certain territory,
or establishes a social compact among a particular people, would dismiss
Zoya's claim on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted (a dismissal on the legal merits). Such judges might be said
to ascribe to a territorialist or social compact theory of the Constitution.
Some might believe that whether the matter interferes with the foreign af-
fairs interests of the United States is the determinative question on which
dismissal rests. Still others, whose constitutional vision we might call func-
tionalist, would ask whether the extension of this part of the Constitution
beyond the people within our nation's borders would be impracticable or
anomalous. Maybe Zoya's case would survive that inquiry, and maybe not.
But regardless of which starting point one selects, they all share a common
virtue: each judicial action is consistent with its judge's particular constitu-
tional philosophy.
It is equally easy to identify numerous nonconstitutional grounds for
dismissal of the suit. Statutory grounds might have been raised to argue that
the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case.2 Perhaps the Government
could have persuaded the court that Zoya had not alleged sufficient facts to
suggest that her allegations were plausible.3 Or the United States could have
moved to dismiss on the grounds that, although plausible, the allegations
presented a political question that implicated the delicate conduct of the
nation's foreign affairs.4 Alternatively, the government might have submitted
an affidavit from an appropriate high-level official asserting that the com-
plaint must be dismissed to prevent the disclosure of state secrets about the
country's diplomatic or military affairs.'
None of that happened. Instead, four federal judges on two courts
granted the Government's motion to dismiss Zoya's complaint on the
ground that she lacked prudential standing to sue.6 The judges asked: Does
Zoya have a prior substantial connection to the United States? Since Zoya's
2. Jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) (2006). Foreign litigants may sue the United States in this court only if their own gov-
ernments accord a reciprocal right to U.S. citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 2502(a) (2006).
3. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
4. See, e.g., EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding that the president's order to destroy an alleged chemical weapons factory in Sudan, a
nation at peace with the United States, presented a nonjusticiable political question).
5. See, e.g., EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2006) (applying state-
secrets doctrine to dismiss constitutional claims of noncitizen arising from alleged extraordinary
rendition abroad).
6. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 387 (2007), affd, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 314 F. App'x 298 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1315
(2009).
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only connection to the United States was as the victim of this allegedly un-
constitutional action, her complaint was dismissed for lack of prudential
standing and no inquiry was made into the legality of the action itself.'
These judges simply concluded that it would not be prudent to allow this
particular plaintiff access to court. The ultimate question in Zoya's case goes
unanswered not because courts are unable or unauthorized to answer it, but
because, like Bartleby the Scrivener, judges simply prefer not to.8
This decision is (1) inconsistent with any coherent constitutional phi-
losophy and (2) a misapplication of the doctrine of prudential standing. The
"prior substantial-connections" test is an example of doctrinal metamorpho-
sis at its worst. The case that created it, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,9
rejected on the merits a criminal defendant's claim that the Fourth Amend-
ment required exclusion of incriminating evidence obtained by American
officials acting abroad without a warrant. In less than twenty years that
holding has "slipped the surly bonds" of constitutional criminal procedure.' °
In Zoya's case, and increasingly in many others, the test has been trans-
formed into a jurisdictional inquiry into a plaintiff's civil litigation. A starker
legal transplant in such a short span of time-or one as dangerous to our
system of justice-is hard to find.
This Article criticizes the use of a prior substantial-connections test to
deny prudential standing on two separate grounds, one theoretical and one
quite practical. First, this standing inquiry is inconsistent with any theoreti-
cal view of the Constitution's extraterritoriality. Consider again the range of
viewpoints. A true territorialist would not care how substantial a connection
Zoya had to the United States if Zoya were not in the United States as those
physical boundaries have been variously defined. An advocate of a limited
government theory would be equally hard pressed to explain the accordion-
like expansion and contraction of de facto government authority that results
when standing to sue is based on judgments about the substantiality of a
foreign plaintiff's connection to the United States. As to functionalists, rea-
sonable minds may differ about the result to which a judgment of
impracticality and anomaly would lead. Where the foreign affairs inquiry
would lead is equally uncertain. But those questions cannot be answered by
a limited inquiry into the degree of connection that the plaintiff possesses to
the United States. Even advocates of a social compact theory of the Consti-
tution ultimately concede that there exists a class of government conduct
7. The courts did not hold that this was a case of damnum absque injuria, that an injury of
this kind is not a legal injury redressable by an action for damages. Of course it is. Nor did the
judges struggle to discern the extraterritorial limits of the Constitution, which would have resolved
the legal merits of Zoya's claim. Finally, these judges did not conclude that they lacked jurisdiction
under the Constitution to adjudicate Zoya's complaint. Zoya's complaint alleges all of the elements
required for constitutional standing: a concrete injury in fact fairly traceable to the defendant and
redressable through an award of money damages. See infra Section ll.B. 1.
8. HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY, THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL-STREET (1853).
9. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
10. JOHN G. MAGEE, JR., HIGH FLIGHT (1941) ("Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of Earth
/ And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings... ").
[Vol. 108:673
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that the Constitution forbids and that the courts must remedy, no matter
where it occurs and no matter who is the victim.
My second criticism is that this theoretical inconsistency has practical
consequences. Because the prior substantial-connections test lacks any firm
constitutional foundation as part of a standing inquiry, it promotes none of
the values that this facet of prudential standing (called zone-of-interests
analysis) is supposed to serve. These are not cases in which we would doubt
the plaintiff's interest or ability to zealously pursue her case. Zoya, for ex-
ample, was represented pro bono by the respected international law firm of
Shearman and Sterling. Nor do these cases lead to suspicion that the claim-
ants seek to use the courts to make an end run around the democratic
process, for these claimants have no political access or interests. That is
what makes them so vulnerable to this form of judicial discretion in the first
place. Nor does reluctance to determine the rights of conventional, but for-
eign, litigants who allege unlawful government action further principles of
judicial restraint. Rather, it imprudently abdicates an important judicial role
in policing the limits of government power." When such discretion is in-
flicted on litigants so poorly placed to seek redress from the political
branches either for their alleged injuries or for access to a judicial remedy,
this application of "prudence" is a license to ration justice.
As I illustrate below, the substantial-connections test of prudential stand-
ing-"Zoya's problem"-is spreading like kudzu. It can be found in a wide
variety of takings claims, Bivens actions, and in more and more briefs and
opinions concerning the constitutional rights of foreign litigants swept up in
the so-called War on Terror.12 As this new prudential-standing test prolifer-
ates, it has a pernicious effect on policymakers and the lawyers who advise
and defend them. There is a danger that such officials may interpret the in-
ability of aggrieved parties to challenge state action as carte blanche to act
abroad without fear of suit by putative victims who otherwise would have a
litigable cause of action.
This Article argues that the gates of American justice should not be
barred by this recent innovation. Without taking a position on the merits of
Zoya's claim, this Article argues that, absent some collateral ground for
dismissal, a court should reach the issue of extraterritoriality that Zoya's
claim presents.13 Since prudential standing is a judge-made rule, Congress
can and should eliminate this permutation of it. Removing this ill-conceived,
judicially imposed filter will neither open the floodgates to foreign litigation
nor deny the executive branch constitutional tools for the conduct of the
11. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of By, and For the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARiozo L. REv. 1, 72 (2008) ("One result of
cloaking merits-based decisions as standing-based rulings is obfuscation of the laws controlling
government action. The judiciary is able to avoid 'say[ing] what the law is' by preventing plaintiffs
from petitioning for relief." (internal citations omitted)).
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. If, for example, the litigation would raise a nonjusticiable question reserved to the politi-
cal branches, or expose state secrets, dismissal may be appropriate. Reasonable minds may differ on
these issues, but they do not turn on the extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
March 2010]
Michigan Law Review
nation's foreign affairs and the protection of our national security. To the
contrary, it will help to remove a pall over American justice at a time when
many have forgotten that "[t]he courts of the United States have traditionally
been open to nonresident aliens." 4 Removing an unnecessary impediment to
decisions on the merits will also free courts to discern the extraterritorial
limits of the Constitution, limits that this strange new standing test keeps
obscured in the shadows of nondecision.
Of course, not every extraterritorial constitutional claim should be
heard. 5 I conclude by distinguishing what I term "unexceptional" civil liti-
gation like Zoya's case, which does not implicate foreign policy or national
security, from "exceptional" civil litigation that does. Zoya's case is easy to
misconceive as inextricably intertwined with foreign policy or military ne-
cessity. In an era of accelerating globalization, the United States often
asserts its power abroad in rather ordinary ways that have little to do with
military force, covert action, or foreign policy. Were those considerations
genuinely present, there would be no need to rest on the clay foundations of
the substantial-connections test to dismiss her lawsuit. When those consid-
erations truly are not present, I argue that such cases should be allowed to
proceed at least to a decision of their legal merits.
The Article is in three parts. Part I sets forth the details of Zoya's case. It
is a fascinating and concrete example to which reference is repeatedly di-
rected in the more theoretical portions of this Article. In Part II, I detail the
development of the substantial-connections test and its perverse new linkage
with the zone-of-interests facet of prudential standing. Here I explain how
badly these two different ideas interact. Reports of the demise of the sub-
stantial-connections test have repeatedly been met by its resurrection and• 16
expansion. Even the apparent ascendance of Justice Kennedy's extraterrito-
14. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (citing Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208
U.S. 570, 578 (1908)).
15. In light of the supremacy given to federal law under Article VI of the Constitution, one
might ask why the reasoning in this Article should not extend to statutory claims as well as constitu-
tional ones. This question, though worthwhile, is outside the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say
that statutory causes of action, by virtue of their source, are less susceptible to the conceptual diffi-
culties that this Article identifies in constitutional litigation. Similarly, one might ask whether the
arguments presented here should be the same for foreign corporations and other legal persons as
they are for individuals like Zoya. This question is obviously important, too, but seems to present
issues that might better be considered separately and after consideration of the more straightforward
issue concerning human plaintiffs. My thanks to the Honorable Hans A. Linde, Distinguished Scho-
lar in Residence at Willamette College of Law, for identifying these possible extensions.
16. This proliferation must seem strange to scholars, such as Gerald Neuman, who have
argued that the substantial-connections test is dead, and that the Supreme Court's recent case ex-
tending habeas rights to detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008), killed it. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 272 (2009). Professor Neuman argues that the functional test pro-
pounded by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez was clearly reaffirmed by him
in his opinion for the Court in Boumediene and is now in ascendance. I disagree with Professor
Neuman that Justice Kennedy's functionalism will replace the substantial-connections test because I
do not share his view that Boumediene has provided an unambiguous rejection of the substantial-
connections test in all of its dangerous permutations. In Zoya's case for example, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit denied en banc review of an opinion relying on this test almost two
months after Boumediene was decided, thus prompting a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
[Vol. 108:673
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rial functionalism may not be enough to foreclose continued reliance on the
test in its prudential-standing incarnation. Part III provides a concise ana-
lytical history of different theories of the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution. With this history as background, I examine the inconsistency
of the new substantial-connections standing test with any view of the Con-
stitution's extraterritorial reach.
I. ZOYA'S STANDING PROBLEM
A. Zoya Atamirzayeva and the Feruza CafN
In November 2005, Zoya Atamirzayeva, a citizen of Uzbekistan (a U.S.
ally in Central Asia), sued the United States on a takings claim.17 The case
wound its way through the United States Court of Federal Claims to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where en banc review of an ad-
verse ruling was denied weeks after the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Boumediene v. Bush." On February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari.' 9 The facts of her case are these.
20
that named conflict with Boumediene as the very first reason to grant the petition. See infra note 38.
The week before the Supreme Court denied this petition, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed a lower court order to release ethnic Uighurs unlawfully held at Guan-
tdnamo Bay into the United States. Judge Randolph, writing for the court, cited Verdugo-Urguidez
among other cases for the proposition that "the due process clause does not apply to aliens without
property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States." Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 E3d
1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 458 (Oct. 20, 2009). The court did not cite
Boumediene except to acknowledge the court's habeas jurisdiction, id. at 1028, and express its view
that Boumediene's holding was limited to the Suspension Clause, id. at 1032. Judge Rogers con-
curred in the judgment only, going so far as to say, "I cannot join the court's analysis because it is
not faithful to Boumediene." Id. at 1033 (Rogers, J., concurring). I am concerned that the misuse of
prudential standing that I describe will continue, if not expand, in a globalized world in which the
United States remains the dominant world power.
17. Complaint, Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (2007) (No. 05-1245 L) [he-
reinafter Compl.]. The complaint was well drafted and seemed to anticipate many of the
nonconstitutional grounds for dismissal described supra, text accompanying notes 2 to 5. It cited
Uzbek law to establish reciprocal rights of U.S. citizens to sue in Uzbek courts. Id. at 2. The plead-
ings clearly satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and would have done so
even under the heightened Twombly plausibility standard. See id. at H 15-17 (alleging that the
Embassy made an "express verbal demand" that Uzbek officials destroy the caf6, that embassy
officials "were physically present at and oversaw" its demolition, and that the security checkpoint
was "constructed in part from the remains of" the caf6).
18. In Boumediene, the Court held that habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to detainees at
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, and concluded that the Military Commissions Act had worked an unconsti-
tutional suspension of the writ. 128 S. Ct. 2229. The Boumediene decision was handed down on
June 12, 2008. Id.. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied en banc review to Atamir-
zayeva on August 5, 2008. See supra note 6.
19. See supra note 6.
20. The locus of these events and the involvement of Uzbek officials naturally leads one to
ask why Zoya did not pursue remedies under Uzbek law in Uzbek courts. Her son, Sobir Atamir-
zayev, offered several reasons why the family did not bother. First, "to appeal to local civil court you
have to pay 10% of the claimed sum.... We don't have such a financial means." Letter from Sobir
Atamirzayev to Jeffrey Kahn and Christopher M. Ryan (Mar. 27, 2009) (on file with author). Sec-
ond, Sobir noted several "recent big infamous cases when some institutions declared about taking
civil actions in Uzbek court of law," but ultimately did not, leading the family to conclude that it
March 2010]
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The Feruza Caf6 used to sit near the United States Embassy in Tashkent,
• 21
the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The caf6 employed roughly
twenty people and consisted of several buildings and a drinks stand. Situated
as it was in a city park on the banks of a small lake, its customers largely
consisted of park visitors and embassy employees. Here is a picture, taken
from a boat on the lake, showing the caf6 in the foreground and one of the
large embassy buildings rising above the tree line on the left:
22
Since 1994, Zoya had been the sole owner of the caf6, which supported
her large family (with an apartment above the caf6 providing additional in-
come)." Here is a picture of Zoya standing with her son, Sobir, whose
efforts to save the family business ultimately led to a violent exchange with
Uzbek authorities that landed him in a local hospital.2
would be futile to file their relatively much smaller claim in courts "notorious for their corruption."
Id. Among those Sobir identified were a large Uzbek telecommunications company, an American
mining company, and the April 2004 closure by the Uzbek Ministry of Justice of the Open Society
Institute Assistance Foundation-Uzbekistan, an organization run by George Soros that distributed
millions of dollars in private and U.S.-funded aid.
21. The facts described here are taken primarily from the complaint. See Compl., supra note
17, at 2. "Feruza" is a common female name as well as the word for "turquoise." Letter from Sobir
Atamirzayev, supra note 20.
22. Photograph of the Feruza Caf6 and surrounding environs provided by and used with the
permission of Christopher M. Ryan, Esq., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington, D.C.
23. Atamirzayeva alleged that she was the sole owner of the buildings that comprised the
Feruza Caf6, but that the Republic of Uzbekistan owned the land. See Compl., supra note 17, at 5.
The United States alleged that the cafe was located in a public park owned by the Republic of Uz-
bekistan. See Answer at 5, Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (2007) (No. 05-01245
L) [hereinafter Answer]. Therefore, the takings claim did not concern any title to land in a foreign
country, only the physical structures themselves.
24. Photograph provided by and used with the permission of Christopher M. Ryan, Esq.,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington, D.C. According to Sobir Atamirzayev, "I was beaten by an
Uzbek Khokimiat (Tashkent mayor's office) ... I was asking for all the documents his office was
holding related to caf6 Feruza. There were no serious injuries. My stay in the hospital was of few
hours." Letter from Sobir Atamirzayev, supra note 20. Quite literally adding insult to injury, Atamir-
zayev's efforts ultimately led him to be fined approximately $10 for disturbing the peace.
Atamirzayev appealed the sentence, but "the court never responded to the appeal and in my turn I
never paid the fine." Id.
[Vol. 108:673
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In her complaint, Zoya alleged that shortly before Christmas 1999, Uz-
bek government authorities in Tashkent "forcibly expelled" her from the
Feruza Caf6, seized the property she had there, and destroyed it.25 A security
checkpoint for the Embassy was installed where her caf6 once stood, "con-
structed in part from the remains of Feruza."
26
The parties sharply disagreed about how these facts implicated the Unit-
ed States. Zoya alleged that U.S. Embassy officials were responsible for
these acts, using the United States' "pervasive influence" over Uzbekistan to
successfully demand the destruction of the caf6 "for the sake of the security
of the US Embassy. '27 She therefore alleged a sort of principal-agent rela-
tionship between the American and Uzbek authorities and sought
compensation from the United States for taking her property. The United
States asserted that although "some members of the United States Embassy
staff physically observed some of the activities related to the removal of the
Feruza Caf6, only after being notified of the removal by officials of the City
of Tashkent," no U.S. official oversaw or otherwise participated in the sei-
zure and demolition itself.2 ' The Embassy refused to compensate Zoya
because "the United States did not request or demand that the Uzbek au-
thorities remove the Feruza Cafr, and the United States did not play a role in
the removal of the Feruza Caf6 by Uzbek authorities. 29
The parties also disagreed about the law. Zoya and her lawyers clearly
ascribed to a constitutional theory under which, if they could prove her
25. See Compl., supra note 17, at 1 16. In its Answer, the United States asserted that it
lacked sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. See Answer, supra note 23, at 16.
26. Compl., supra note 17, at 17. The United States denied the allegations about the secu-
rity checkpoint. Answer, supra note 23, at 9 17.
27. Atamirzayeva alleged that "Officials from the U.S. Embassy were physically present at
and oversaw the demolition of Feruza." Compl., supra note 17, at 16.
28. Answer, supra note 23, at 15-16.
29. Id. at [23.
March 20 101
Michigan Law Review
factual allegations, U.S. officials could not take Zoya's private property
without just compensation, regardless of where the property was located or
by whom it was owned. The United States took a much narrower view of the
Fifth Amendment. Even if the facts that Zoya alleged were true, it argued
that she could not seek compensation under the Takings Clause because she
was a foreigner in a foreign land. The United States moved under Rules
12(b)(6) and 12(c) of the Court of Federal Claims (identical to the
corresponding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) for judgment on the
pleadings. Although the Government argued that the plaintiff had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, it was not the claim that
the Government considered deficient but the litigant: the Government
argued that Zoya lacked standing to sue. 3° The United States read two
Supreme Court opinions, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and Johnson v.
Eisentrager, to establish the "rule" that a foreign citizen without a
substantial connection to the United States lacked standing to allege a
.... 31
constitutional injury. Since Zoya Atamirzayeva lacked any such connection
beyond her alleged injury, the United States urged the court not to hear her
claim.
Plaintiff's counsel did not challenge the propriety of adopting this novel
standing test, but rather set itself the task of distinguishing these cases and
offering alternatives. This choice is understandable. The case law of the
Court of Federal Claims was in conflict with itself, containing cases that
ignored, adopted, and repudiated this test for standing.32 Plaintiff identified
Turney v. United States as the strongest precedent in her favor, a keystone-
kops sort of case in which sensitive military equipment was accidentally
sold to a foreign company and then seized by the United States after the
mistake was realized.33 The clawback was held to be a compensable taking.
30. United States' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Supporting Memorandum at 1,
Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (2007) (No. 05-01245 L) [hereinafter U.S. Mot.].
The federal courts are confused, to put it mildly, over whether dismissal should be for failure to state
a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)). See, e.g., Ashkir v.
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 439 n.2 (2000). The Government's argument fit neither rubric.
31. U.S. Mot., supra note 30, at 6. These opinions are described in more depth infra Sections
II.A and II.B.3. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to the search and seizure of a nonresident alien's foreign property by U.S.
officials. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court declined to extend the writ of
habeas corpus to German nationals convicted by an American military commission located in China
and detained in postwar Germany by the U.S. Army.
32. Tumey v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (holding that the Takings Clause
extends to foreign-owned property outside United States); Ashkir, 46 Fed. Cl. 438 (citing Verdugo-
Urquidez to hold that alien without substantial connection to the United States lacked standing to
bring Takings Clause claim); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751 (2003)
(criticizing the Ashkir court for importing substantial-connections test in conflict with existing cir-
cuit precedent in Turney extending Takings Clause to foreign property owned by nonresident aliens),
aff'd 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining invitation to overrule Turney in light of Ver-
dugo-Urquidez and dismissing case on alternative ground). Plaintiff's counsel also cited several
cases concerning the Pacific Islands Trust Territories.
33. Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457, concerned property sold by the United States to two American
businessmen who then transferred it to the foreign company. Edward Turney was the liquidating
trustee later appointed to wind down the company's affairs, and he sued the United States in that
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Counsel may well have gambled that the court could be persuaded to follow
the Turney precedent.
Plaintiff's counsel lost that bet. The court concluded that Atamirzayeva
"lacks standing to invoke the Takings Clause ... because she has failed to
demonstrate any substantial connections to the United States. 34 As to plain-
tiff's reliance on Turney, the court held that "even though the Turney court
did not identify the need for substantial connections between the [plaintiffs]
and the United States, the corporation in Turney would have satisfied this
test, whereas Ms. Atamirzayeva decidedly would not."35
Zoya appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That
court's opinion framed the "sole question presented on appeal" as "whether
a foreign citizen with no connection to the United States has a right to just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment for a taking of property that oc-
curs in a foreign country."3 6 This formulation appeared to focus on the
substantive question of the extraterritorial reach of the Takings Clause, not
the jurisdictional question of standing. Nevertheless, the appellate court af-
firmed the lower court's decision, including its reading of Turney. Plaintiff's
petition for rehearing en banc was denied without a written opinion.
37
Zoya's counsel filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court on November 3, 2008. In their petition, Zoya's counsel first correctly
described the trial court's inquiry into Zoya's standing, but then confused
the court's jurisdictional holding with one on the merits, stating that the
court "concluded that... [Zoya] has no constitutional right to just compen-
sation."38 Citing the intervening Boumediene decision, Zoya's counsel
argued that this recent case mandated a more flexible, functional test instead
of the "arbitrary rule" of the substantial-connections test."
The brief for the United States in opposition to the petition (among the
last filings in the Supreme Court by the Department of Justice under the
capacity. The corporation was identified in an unrelated opinion by the Court of Claims as an "alien
corporation," presumably Filipino. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 603 (Ct. Cl. 1955). The
citizenship of none of the participants was identified in the opinion, although Turney and the former
airmen were apparently identified in briefs as U.S. citizens. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed.
Cl. 378, 380 nn.5-6 (2007).
34. Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 387.
35. Id. This distinction is explored more fully infra Section II.B.3.
36. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1322 (2008). The appellate court charac-
terized the lower court as having held "that Ms. Atamirzayeva did not have a right to relief under the
Fifth Amendment because she did not plead any connection to the United States." Id. at 1326. This
is emphatically not what the lower court held.
37. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 314 F. App'x 298 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
38. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Atamirzayeva v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1315 (2009)
(No. 08-600). Actually, the court held that Zoya "does not have standing to invoke the protection of
the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment for an alleged taking by the United States."
Atanirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 387. Zoya's counsel did better restating the Federal Circuit's holding to
be that "she was not entitled to pursue a Takings Clause action for the taking of her property'" Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 9 (emphasis added). Although "entitled" confused the
distinction between constitutional and prudential standing, it did make clear that the matter was one
of pursuance, not success on the merits.
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 38, at 9.
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outgoing administration of President George W. Bush) was extraordinary if
for no other reason than that it did not even contain the word "standing"
within its pages. The Government's cited cases, none of which concerned
the Takings Clause,40 each addressed the merits of a due process claim
brought in a criminal, immigration, or military context.4' This broad brush
treatment was followed by a much more finely wrought effort to distinguish
Boumediene as resting on the "unique status" of Guantdnamo Bay and the
narrow issue of the Suspension Clause. 4' The brief concluded by raising the
specter of terrorism, suggesting that the "severe terrorist risks to U.S. inter-
ests" that the Embassy faced in Uzbekistan would have rendered
exterritorial application of the Takings Clause "particularly inappropriate,"
again citing Boumediene.43
On Februrary 23, 2009, the Supreme Court issued an order list on which
it denied the petition for a writ of certiorari without comment, thus ending
the litigation."
B. From the Feruza Caf to the War on Terror
The substantial-connections test of prudential standing-"Zoya's prob-
lem"-is spreading. This development has extraordinary implications for
Executive Branch operations overseas for it amounts to judicial abdication
of supervision over the peacetime conduct by government officials against
the "right" kind of foreigner, whether her claim is for an alleged taking, or
extraordinary rendition, or worse. Many foreign plaintiffs with varied claims
have suffered the same fate as Zoya.
For example, the claims of Holocaust survivors seeking just compensa-
tion for property seized by American soldiers after World War II were also
foreclosed by the application of the test.45 The property in question was al-
leged to have been carried in the famous "Gold Train," which was intended
to transport the looted property of Hungarian Jews for delivery by a pro-
Nazi Hungarian government to Nazi Germany in 1945.46 American soldiers
intercepted and seized possession of the Gold Train en route, closely guard-
ing the jewelry, artwork, and other assets in warehouses in occupied
Austria.47 Many years later, the plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that the
40. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 4-5, Atamirzayeva, 129 S. Ct. 1315 (No. 08-
600).
41. Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950)).
42. Id. at 5-6.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Atamirzayeva, 129 S. Ct. 1315 (mem.).
45. Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
46. Id. at 1204.
47. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that "the actual taking of the Gold Train property occurred after
hostilities had ceased and peace was formally declared." Id. at 1212 n.14.
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U.S. Government could have returned the property to its surviving owners
or descendants, but instead sold or distributed the property to others.48
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the United States had taken their
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The court dismissed the claim, adopting the Government's argument that
because the alleged taking occurred outside the United States at a time when
the plaintiffs were not U.S. citizens, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted: they lacked a "substantial connection"
to the United States. 49 The court expressed its anxiety that "[t]o hold other-
wise would be to invite constitutional claims against the United States
government from all over the world, and hence, start a path down a very
slippery slope."5"
Outside of takings, the test has been used to deny aliens access to court
on a variety of constitutional claims. Such was the fate, for example, of for-
eign nationals who alleged that their designation as narcotics traffickers and
subsequent blocking of their assets by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
violated the Ex Post Facto and Attainder Clauses of the Constitution.5' Cit-
ing Verdugo-Urquidez, the court held that as foreign nationals without a
substantial connection to the United States, plaintiffs "lack[ed] standing to
bring a challenge under Article I, Section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution."
5 2
48. Id. at 1205.
49. Id. at 1212. The Government cited Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438 (2000), Unit-
ed States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950) in support of its argument. Id. The United States argued that "[wlithout such a connection,
there is no basis on which to infer a social compact between a plaintiff and the United States
through which the plaintiff consented to be governed in exchange for the protections of the Consti-
tution." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) at 14, Rosner, 231 E Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 01-1859-CIV-
SEITZ).
50. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. The court evaded direct reference to the plaintiffs'
standing, but that is hardly uncommon in the confused world of standing, "a word game played by
secret rules." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But its reference to
the Ashkir case as "particularly instructive" gave the game away. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
Ashkir held that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert his takings claim because he lacked substan-
tial connections to the United States. Ashkir, 46 Fed. Cl. at 444.
Cases abound in which what the district court does sub silentio the appellate court labels dis-
missal for want of standing. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Smith, 555 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D.D.C. 1982)
(dismissing for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted a nonresident alien's action
against Attorney General for alleged involvement in freeze of bank assets by Swiss authorities,
holding that the court "has no basis for attempting to apply constitutional standards on behalf of a
nonresident alien with respect to a res which is not subject to the Court's control"), rev'd in part,
733 F.2d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting dismissal is "the proper result if a plaintiff lacks stand-
ing" and "read[ing] the court's opinion as holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise the
tendered constitutional claims").
51. Appellant's Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Carolina Rodriguez Arbelaez, et al. at 4, 6,
Arbelaez v. Newcomb, 1 F. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5217).
52. Arbelaez, 1 F. App'x at 1. Interestingly enough, although the Court of Appeals concluded
that plaintiffs lacked standing, the order of district court Judge Oberdorfer that the appellate court
affirmed had granted the defendant summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs' connections
(two modest bank accounts) were not substantial enough to raise an issue of material fact. Arbelaez
v. Newcomb, No. 98-2813-LFO (D.D.C. filed May 16, 2000). As will be seen infra Section I.B.,
this conflation of jurisdictional and merits questions is common when the issue of standing is raised.
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The test has also been applied to civil rights claims by aliens alleging
physical abuse by American border guards.13 Maria Martinez-Aguero was a
Mexican citizen living in Mexico who assisted her aunt in crossing the U.S.
border at El Paso each month to collect a check at the Social Security office
there.14 During one such trip, Martinez-Aguero alleged that a U.S. border
patrol agent violently assaulted her and arrested her on false charges in re-
taliation for questioning his authority.5 The United States sought to dismiss
her Bivens claims, relying on Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager to contend
that she had no constitutional rights because she lacked a "substantial con-
nection" to the United States.56 The Court applied the test to determine
whether the plaintiff "has standing under the Fourth Amendment to chal-
lenge unlawful arrest and the excessive use of force" and concluded that her
lawful monthly visits constituted "substantial connections" that satisfied the
test.
5 7
Courts may well be using this test more at the urging of government at-
torneys who appear before them. The test appears with increasing frequency
in legal briefs concerning foreigners captured in the so-called War on Terror.
Respondents and several amici filed briefs in Boumediene v. Bush, the Su-
preme Court's most recent case concerning detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, in
which they urged the application of the substantial-connections test or vig-
orously fought to discourage its anticipated use.58 Justice Kennedy's opinion
states: "Because the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, like the
substantive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, ... pro-
tects persons as well as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege of
litigating in our courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles
53. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006).
54. Id. at 620.
55. Id. at 620-21.
56. Brief of Appellant at 7-11, Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d 618 (No. 05-50472). It is unclear,
but probable, that the United States intended the substantial-connections test to decide the legal
merits of plaintiff's legal claims. That said, the United States asserted in its brief both that plaintiff
"had no constitutional rights" and that aliens like plaintiff must establish a substantial connection
"in order to invoke constitutional rights." Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
57. Martinez-Aguero, 459 F3d at 624-25. Whether the court truly thought of itself as evalu-
ating plaintiff's standing or the legal merits is unclear. The court initially described its task as
determining whether "Martinez-Aguero is entitled to the protection of these constitutional guaran-
tees:' id. at 622, but subsequently announced "[w]e turn now to whether she has standing under the
Fourth Amendment," id. at 624.
58. Brief for the Respondents at 20, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-
1195) ("Instead, this Court has declared, aliens 'receive constitutional protections when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this coun-
try.'" (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))); Brief Amici Curiae
of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies et al. in Support of Respondents at 8, Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195) ("Under this standard, no constitutional rights appertain to Petition-
ers, who have never 'developed substantial connections' with the United States." (quoting Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271)); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and Public
Justice in Support of Petitioners at 13 n. 9, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195) (criticizing
and distinguishing substantial-connections test).
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.... But which foreign nationals have the privilege of litigating in our
courts, and is this a determination made as a jurisdictional matter or as a
conclusion on the merits about the reach of the Constitution abroad?
60
Cases after Boumediene have confirmed continued interest in this ver-
sion of the substantial-connections test. In Rasul v. Rumsfeld, former
detainees at Guantdnamo Bay alleged constitutional and statutory injuries
during their confinement, namely torture and infringement of their religious
liberties.6' Prior to Boumediene, the District Court reserved judgment about
whether the detainees had any constitutional rights at all but, assuming ar-
guendo that they did, held that the government defendants had qualified
immunity because these rights were not clearly established at the time be-
cause (citing Verdugo-Urquidez) plaintiffs lacked a substantial connection to
the United States.6' The Court of Appeals affirmed. 6' Arguing against the
plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari after Boumediene was decided, the
United States urged that "Boumediene did not overturn the Court's prior
rulings that the individual-rights provisions of the Constitution run only to
aliens who have a substantial connection to our country and not to enemy
combatants who are detained abroad" 64 The Supreme Court granted the pe-
tition only to simultaneously vacate the lower court judgment and remand
the case back to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
65for further consideration in light of Boumediene.
Courts hearing cases alleging extraordinary rendition have also found
the substantial-connections test to be an irresistible doctrinal temptation. In
Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit considered claims stemming from the
59. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (citations omitted).
60. Dissenting in Boumediene, Justice Scalia (who had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's
plurality in Verdugo-Urquidez), joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito,
quoted the language of Kennedy's Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence back to him, language (as I ex-
plore in detail below) that is hardly a repudiation of the substantial-connections test. Id. at 2306
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the "undoubted proposition that the Constitution does not create, nor
do general principles of law create, any juridical relation between our country and some undefined,
limitless class of noncitizens who are beyond our territory." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
61. Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27 (D.D.C. 2006).
62. Id. at 44.
63. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
64. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 18, Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008)
(No. 08-235).
65. Rasul, 129 S. Ct. 763 (mem.). Likewise, even though the plaintiff in al-Marri v. Pucci-
arelli was seized as an enemy combatant within the United States, four judges of a splintered en
banc panel of the Fourth Circuit felt it necessary to repeatedly reference the substantial-connections
test, citing Verdugo-Urquidez. Al-Mari v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J.,
concurring, joined by Michael, King & Gregory, JJ.). The Supreme Court granted certiorari only to
vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions that it be dismissed as moot after al-
Marri was indicted on conspiracy and material support charges and transferred from military to
civilian custody. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, "Ali
Al-Marri Indicted for Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda," Feb. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-ag-177.html.
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country's most notorious case of extraordinary rendition. 66 While affirming
dismissal of the complaint on other grounds, the Second Circuit felt com-
pelled to cite Verdugo-Urquidez in critiquing the dissent's inadequate
attention to the extraterritorial nature of some of Arar's claims.67
II. STANDING AND THE SUBSTANTIAL-CONNECTIONS TEST
Both the zone-of-interests test of prudential standing and the substantial-
connections test of the merits of constitutional claims are relatively new judi-
cial creations. They emerged in very different contexts and, until very
recently, they had nothing to do with each other. The zone-of-interests test of
prudential standing (which was applied to Zoya's case) has its origins in the
1970s as part of the growth of the administrative state.6' This test denied
standing to litigants who otherwise met constitutional standing requirements if
their claims fell outside the "zone of interests" that the statute or constitutional
provision was intended to protect. The substantial-connections test was cre-
ated in 1990 in the context of determining the merits of an argument about the
extraterritorial application of the Warrants Clause.69 As originally conceived,
this "test" was really just a conclusion that constitutional history, text, and
logic limited application of this provision to "the People" of the United States.
The combination of zone-of-interests prudential standing and the sub-
stantial-connections test at the start of the twenty-first century transformed
the latter from a test used to resolve the merits of an alien's constitutional
criminal defense to a way to evaluate the alien's privilege to be a plaintiff in
a civil suit at all. This Section examines the steps toward that merger. Sec-
tion II.A describes the origins of the substantial-connections test and
describes the confusion, right from the start, about its constitutional prem-
ises. Section II.B describes the transformation of that test from a merits
inquiry into a jurisdictional inquiry.
66. The fullest account of this incident is undoubtedly found in COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO
THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS
RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006).
67. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 179 n.15 (2d Cir. 2008). The dissent, in its turn, ac-
knowledged the appropriateness of its sister circuit's reliance on the substantial-connections test in
dismissing an extraterritorial Fifth Amendment claim of torture. Id. at 205 n. 18 (citing application of
the Verdugo-Urquidez test to Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'don other
grounds sub nom Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)).
After rehearing the case en banc, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). The court declined to extend plaintiff's Bivens claim
to the "new context" it held to be presented by extraordinary rendition, Id. at 563. The court noted
"foreign policy considerations," citing Verdugo-Urquidez, as one of a number of special factors
counseling hesitation. Id. at 573 (citing that portion of Verdugo-Urquidez in which the Court ex-
pressed concern that "aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for
damages" to remedy claimed constitutional injuries incurred abroad).
68. Ass'n of Data Serv. Processing Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
69. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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A. Creation: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
To understand just how completely the substantial-connections test has
been wrenched free of its original context, it is worth taking a close look at
the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, where
the test made its first appearance. In addition, a close look at the oral argu-
ment that influenced it demonstrates the difficulties inherent in grounding
the substantial-connections test in any firm theoretical foundation.
The federal prosecution of Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez presented
the question whether the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement had
extraterritorial application. The U.S. Government obtained a warrant for
the defendant's arrest.70 After Mexican authorities arrested Verdugo-
Urquidez in Mexico, he was transferred to the custody of U.S. marshals in
California, where he awaited trial on federal drug charges. U.S. D.E.A
agents, cooperating with Mexican police officials, then searched for and
seized incriminating evidence from Verdugo-Urquidez's two residences in
Mexico.7 ' No warrant was sought from an American magistrate for the
search of his foreign residences once he was in U.S. custody in California.
Did the Fourth Amendment apply to this situation? It is hornbook law
that "a violation of the [Fourth] Amendment is fully accomplished at the
time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion. 72 To phrase the question
differently, is the Fourth Amendment violated when the place of the prop-
erty searched is abroad, but its owner and his jailor and the trial where the
fruits of the search will be used are in the United States? Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, was quite aware that Verdugo-Urquidez
was in federal custody in the United States at the time of the search abroad,
but concluded that Fourth Amendment protections should not turn on that
"fortuitous circumstance."7 1 Strangely, the Court repeatedly phrased the issue
as if it were faced with a circumstance in which both the property and the
property-holder were outside the United States.74 This altered the tone of the
opinion, simplifying the facts to neglect that "fortuitous circumstance. 75
70. Id. at 262. The defendant was suspected to be the kingpin of a major drug smuggling
operation. He had previously been convicted of the torture and murder of a DEA special agent. Id.
71. Id. at 262-63.
72. Id. at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Violation of the Fifth Amendment right to
self-incrimination, on the other hand, "occurs only at trial." Id.
73. Id. at 272.
74. Compare id. at 261 ("The question presented by this case is whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country."), id. at 266 ("[Ilt was never suggested that the
[Fourth Amendment] was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens
outside of the United States territory."), id. at 267 ("There is likewise no indication that the Fourth
Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United
States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters."), and id. at 268
("[R]espondent's claim that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign na-
tions is even weaker."), with id. at 272 ("When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had
been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of
whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the United
States at the time the search was made.").
75. Id. at 272.
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The plurality opinion held that the Fourth Amendment presented no
impediment to the search because Verdugo-Urquidez did not have a "pre-
vious significant voluntary connection" with the United States that would
lead to his inclusion among "the people" that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects." Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that a variety of cases establish
"that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within
the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections
with this country."" But none of the cases that the Chief Justice cited actu-
ally contained the phrase "substantial connections," let alone used
anything like it as a test of the Constitution's applicability abroad.78 The
Chief Justice did not purport to be quoting from these cases to derive this
new test, but offered no other doctrinal support for it.
At first glance, this holding would appear to subscribe to the social
compact theory of the Constitution that the Government petitioners pre-
sented. But the opinion is ambivalent on that score. Certainly, Verdugo-
Urquidez is frozen out of Fourth Amendment protection because the Chief
Justice says that he is not one of "the people" that the Amendment was
intended to protect.79 But that historical argument attracted only a plurality
of the Court. Furthermore, the Court's reasoning elsewhere in the opinion
adopts a territorial theory of the Constitution.8"
Justice Kennedy concurred in both the opinion and the judgment of the
Court.8' However, he concluded that he could not "place any weight on the
76. Id. at 271,273.
77. Id. at 271.
78. Compare id. (citing Plyler, Yick Wo, and Kwong Hai Chew), with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 212 (1982) (concerning state attempts to limit the equal protection obligation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the children of undocumented aliens within their territory), Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (expressing same Fourteenth Amendment protection for aliens from discrimi-
nation in the licensing discretion of city officials), and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
596 n.5 (1953) (concerning the admission into the United States of a returning noncitizen permanent
resident). The case of Kwong Hai Chew comes closest in that it refers in dicta to the "generous and
ascending scale of rights as [the alien] increases his identity with our society." Kwong Hai Chew,
344 U.S. at 596 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 770 (1950)). But the reference in both cases was made in the context of describing the rights of
noncitizens seeking admission to, or resisting expulsion from, the United States. It does not follow
that, outside the country, an alien's "generous and ascending scale of rights" begins in all respects
and in all contexts at zero. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
80. Id. at 266 (presenting historical arguments that the Fourth Amendment's purpose was as
a protection "in domestic matters" and was never "intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States territory"); id. at 268 ("[O1ur rejection of
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic .... " (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763)); id. at 271 ("These cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections
when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections
with this country." (emphasis added)).
81. Id. at 275-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, on the other hand, concurred in
the judgment only, finding the historical discussion of "the people" to be irrelevant. Id. at 279 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in judgment). He simply found that the search was not unreasonable. Id.
Because Congress had not granted U.S. magistrates power to authorize searches abroad, Justice
Stevens found the Warrant Clause inapplicable. Id. This seemed to put the cart before the horse. The
warrant in this case would have given a judicial imprimatur not to the right of U.S. officials to con-
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reference to 'the people' in the Fourth Amendment as a source of
restricting its protections. 82 He preferred the plurality opinion in Reid v.
Covert that "the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes,
whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic. 8 3 But this
approach, seemingly adopting a limited-government theory of the
Constitution, was only a starting point for Justice Kennedy, not a blanket
expression of a theory of constitutional extraterritoriality. Again drawing
on Reid (this time Justice Harlan's concurrence), Justice Kennedy
concluded that application of a provision of the Constitution abroad must
not be "impracticable and anomalous," which in his opinion would be the
case here.84 This approach would become what has been called Justice
Kennedy's "functional" test.
To suggest that the location of the search matters more than the loca-
tion of the owner of the property to be searched is, at first glance, a strange
approach, "[f]or the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
Even as to citizens, who are undoubtedly part of "the people" the Fourth
Amendment protects, the opinion hedges: it studiously avoids any refer-
ence to the expatriate citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. Its references to
the Insular Cases (many of which involved U.S. citizens abroad) make
this evasion clear. And its reference to Reid v. Covert is only to exclude its
broad statements from application to the Fourth Amendment. Its policy
arguments, which forecast significant disruption to the nation's military
duct a search in a foreign country but to the reasonableness the officials were required to possess
before taking the next step toward such a search: seeking the permission of the foreign sovereign to
search within its territory. That permission could only be given by foreign officials, not by a U.S.
court. But by the same token, the reasonableness of the U.S. officials' search (and therefore their
power to conduct it) could only be ascertained by American judges, not foreign police. If American
magistrates lacked statutory power to do what the Constitution required-confirm the reasonable-
ness of nonemergency executive conduct-then the answer was to pass such a statute, not conform
the Constitution to the existing statutory lacunae.
82. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957)).
84. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). That conclusion,
explicated in short order in the penultimate paragraph of the concurrence, is strange. While
reserving the question of a citizen's Fourth Amendment protection abroad, Kennedy pointed to the
absence of judicial authorities to issue warrants, confusion over what reasonableness and privacy
might mean abroad, and the need for cooperation with foreign officials. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). But resolution of these issues would not have been impracticable or anomalous in
Verdugo-Urquidez's case. Because Verdugo-Urquidez was in a San Diego jail, both a local judge
and local standards could have determined whether American officials had probable cause to search
the defendant's property. The plea to foreign cooperation is, at best, irrelevant in this case (it is hard
to imagine foreign officials more cooperative than these Mexican police) and, at worst, results-
oriented policymaking from a judicial bench ill suited to assess such difficulties.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
86. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304 (1922) (defendant-petitioner a U.S. citizen);
Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138, 156 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority's holding
does not distinguish according to citizenship). It should be acknowledged that, although these cases
undeniably concerned distant and unincorporated territories outside the United States, it was their
very unusual nature as sovereign possessions of the United States that made the cases noteworthy,
and their legacy so long lasting.
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and intelligence work overseas, apply equally well to citizens and aliens
abroad.
During oral argument, Lawrence Robbins, assistant to the Solicitor
General and counsel for petitioner United States, emphasized the extrater-
ritorial nature of the official conduct. This fit squarely with the
Government's underlying theme of Constitution as social compact."s When
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asked him what prevented American offi-
cials abroad from breaking into houses and seizing evidence, assuming
they could get away with it in the host jurisdiction, Mr. Robbins stated that
the Fourth Amendment simply "doesn't control the analysis of that ques-
tion."' 9
"What did?" counsel was asked. There would come a point, Mr. Rob-
bins explained, when the victim of government excess could rely upon "a
safety net to this argument provided by the Due Process Clause which op-
erates in a very different way from the Fourth Amendment ... if the
agents went in there and behaved in a fashion that just bespoke utterly no
limitations."90 But this Fifth Amendment protection, articulated in the case
of Rochin v. California,9' did not extend extraterritorially, either. The Ro-
chin test of conduct that "shocks the conscience" would be applied
domestically, because the particular conscience to be shocked was the
conscience of an American judge sitting in an American courtroom. While
the political branches could, by treaty or statute, limit the powers of
American officials abroad, those limits were not provided by extraterrito-
92
rial application of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.
Michael Pancer, counsel for Respondent-Defendant Verdugo-Urquidez,
opened his presentation to the Court not from the perspective of his cli-
ent's rights, but from the perspective of the government official's source of
legal authority. Pancer explained this view when he was asked whether
"Mexican authorities would be a little bit annoyed with an American offi-
88. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17-18, Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (No. 88-1353)
[hereinafter Or. Arg.] ("Finally, the last factor that we think is relevant is what is the relationship of
the claimant to the United States? This is a familiar inquiry, one raised in Johnson against Eisen-
trager, more recently in Landon against Plasencia and the basic notion is that, 'aliens are accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.' This is a point
that comes up in a great many of the immigration cases. And the notion is, again, the closer the
connection to the United States of citizenship or naturalization or permanent residence, the greater
the claim for the protections of the social compact.").
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. Id. at 7.
91. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
92. Or. Arg., supra note 88. Invited to speculate whether in the absence of a criminal prose-
cution that would present the "shocks the conscience" issue in an American courtroom, the United
States could act "with impunity" abroad, Mr. Robbins refused to take the bait. "Well," he said, "im-
punity may make a greater claim that [sic] we wish to make here." Id. at 9. Counsel was willing to
concede, however, that the Constitution "sometimes" controlled the actions of U.S. officials abroad.
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cial issuing a document that authorizes an American law enforcement offi-
cer to search their territory."93 Mr. Pancer replied:
I think they would be very annoyed if that document was presented to
them by the agents as something that said this gives us the right vis-a-vis
the Government of the Republic of Mexico to take action in Mexico.
They'd have every right to be outraged.
No. All we're saying that the warrant does is create a relationship be-
tween the evidence and the court in the United States. It can't authorize
the agents to search if the Mexican authorities don't want them to or
don't give them permission. But it can say that this search is legal ac-
cording to the laws of the United States. And that's all we're saying that
the warrant accomplishes. Clearly, it can't force the Mexicans to let the
agents search.94
These exchanges in oral argument are important for the argument ad-
vanced in this Article, for they forecast the difficulty inherent in drawing
sharp lines to distinguish the constitutional rights held by individuals on
the basis of territory or "substantial prior connection" to the United States.
The Government's social compact theory ultimately fails to explain its
counsel's concession that official extraterritorial conduct by the United
States against aliens with no prior substantial connection to the United
States may ultimately be constrained by a "shocks the conscience" stan-
dard obtained from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Likewise, counsel for Verdugo-Urquidez focuses on the source of govern-
ment power, rather than on the distribution of constitutional rights to
various individuals at home or abroad.
Consider those concessions in the context of Zoya's case. Framing her
claim as an exercise of her individual right to just compensation under the
Takings Clause invites a doctrine of exclusion that ultimately descended
into the discretionary exercise in judicial line drawing that marked the
standing analysis that ended her case. As in Verdugo-Urquidez, it is possi-
ble to expose how unconnected those lines are to any consistent theory of
the Constitution: simply imagine ever more egregious government con-
duct, in which case we discover that the distant alien plaintiff does have a
right to be free from conduct that "shocks the conscience," at least if he or
she can gain access to a U.S. court. In a criminal prosecution, such as the
one that convicted Verdugo-Urquidez, that access is presumed. But when
the substantial-connections test is removed from that context and re-
imagined as a jurisdictional test, the protection that the government pre-
sumed that its argument would preserve-a limit on government power
that extends beyond territory and beyond social compact-is utterly lost.
That transformation is explored in the next Section.
93. Id. at 26.
94. Id. at 26-27.
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B. Transformation: Substantial Connections & Prudential Standing
The Supreme Court has imposed limits on who may come before the
federal courts. These limits, grounded in a sense of judicial prudence,
extend beyond those limits that the Constitution has been read to require.9
This prudential-standing doctrine "should be governed by general princi-
ples, rather than ad hoc improvisations.9 6 But the substantial-connections
test of prudential standing is exactly that: an improvisation that transposes
what was originally a test of the merits of a constitutional defense in a
criminal case into a test of a court's jurisdiction to decide a plaintiff's
standing in civil litigation. In other words, what was once a test of the
merits is transformed into a means to avoid resolving the merits at all, by
declaring the court to be without jurisdiction because the plaintiff is de-
clared to be without standing.
The "substantial connection" that this test imagines, like the concept of
standing onto which the test has been grafted, turns out to be a rather
strange term of art. To borrow from Joseph Vining, judges facing foreign
plaintiffs are seemingly mesmerized by them both. 97 In some ways, this is
not surprising. The transformation of prudential standing to exclude for-
eign litigants may be part of a larger trend in the federal courts to reframe
standing doctrines in general. 9 It has often been remarked that standing is
a confused doctrine that is particularly susceptible to the elision of juris-
dictional questions with the merits of the case.99 As was seen above in
Section I.B, no improvisation conflates those very different questions
more than the substantial-connections test.
There are now six recognized species in the genus of justiciability
called standing. These are divided equally among constitutional and pru-
dential standing. In Zoya's case, as in the case of other would-be plaintiffs
whose cases are dismissed for lack of a prior substantial connection, only
one of these six is implicated. It is worth taking the time to see why under
any test-old or new-there is no question that Zoya and plaintiffs like
her easily satisfy the other five requirements. Section II.B.1 undertakes
95. See infra text accompanying note 109.
96. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 25 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing in part).
97. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY xi (1978) ("Standing is a term of art that mesmer-
izes.").
98. Weinstein, supra note 11, at 62 ("In the past half century, however, the courts have in-
creasingly taken it upon themselves to close their doors to parties and complaints that they consider
unsuitable for judicial resolution. One of the chief ways of petitioning for redress is through cases
brought in our courts. Principal among the tools we use in violation of the constitutional promise of
the right to petition is the doctrine of standing."); see also Office of Commc'n of United Church of
Christ v. FC.C., 359 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("The gradual expansion and evolution of
concepts of standing in administrative law attests that experience rather than logic or fixed rules has
been accepted as the guide.").
99. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 255, 258 (1961) ("Furthermore the lack of standing in particular cases may be vaguely merged
in the court's mind with lack of merit or with the exercise of judicial discretion not to intervene-so
often relevant to judicial review of public actions.").
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this review. An examination of the evolution of these standing require-
ments also shows how their malleability presents the possibility for novel
legal transplants like the prior substantial-connections test. Section II.B.2
shows how this process occurred. Finally, Section II.B.3 dissects the
sources of analytical danger that emerge from this conceptual confusion.
1. Constitutional Standing and Prudential Standing
The Constitution provides that the federal judicial power shall only ex-
tend to "Cases" or "Controversies."'m From this textual limit, and from the
structural concept of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has im-
posed three requirements on plaintiffs before federal courts will exercise
jurisdiction to hear their claims.'0 ' Plaintiffs must allege (1) an "injury in
fact" that is both (2) "fairly traceable" to the defendant and (3) redressable
by the court. '°2 These requirements are considered to be the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 03
Zoya clearly has constitutional standing. First, loss of her property is
undoubtedly an injury in fact.' °4 Second, Zoya alleges in her complaint
(the truth of which must be assumed for purposes of this inquiry) that the
destruction of her caf6 is fairly traceable to the United States: she contends
that American officials conspired with local Uzbek officials to demolish
the caf6 to improve the embassy's security. Finally, just compensation
would redress her property loss. Zoya unambiguously presents a "Case" or
"Controversy" sufficient for standing under Article III.
Constitutional standing asks questions not about who plaintiffs are but
about their relationship to the injury they allege.15 Thus, the substantial-
connections test has never been applied to evaluate any of these constitu-
tional requirements.'0 Indeed, it is hard to see how it could be. Questions
100. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
101. Ironically, the controversial development of constitutional standing mirrors the more
recent transformation of prudential standing. Many scholars have questioned the validity of current
constitutional standing doctrine on textual, historical, and structural grounds. See, e.g., LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390-92 (3d ed. 2000); Amanda Leiter, Substance or
Illusion? The Dangers ofimposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEo. L. J. 391 (2009); Cass R. Sun-
stein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 11I, 91 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1992); Weinstein, supra note 11, at 62-77.
102. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
103. Id. at 560.
104. It is also a legal injury, cognizable as a cause of action for the taking of her personal
property. For the history and demise of the "legal interest" test of standing, see infra Section II.B.2.
105. Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("For purposes of Article III
standing, Cardenas' status as a nonresident alien does not obviate the existence of her injury; it is the
injury and not the party that determines Article II standing.... Likewise, the location of the injury
does not affect Cardenas' satisfaction of the Article mI standing requirement.").
106. For reasons that are explained more fully below, the injury-in-fact requirement does not
lend itself to the test, notwithstanding its demand that the plaintiff show "invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. One might be tempted to ask "Whose legally protected
interest?" and conclude that someone lacking a prior substantial connection necessarily lacks one.
But the question in an injury-in-fact inquiry is not "whose" but "what." It is the injury and not the
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about this injury (whether legal or factual or a shifting m6lange of both),
its source (whether in a classical common law legal right, or more modem
conceptions of constitutional, statutory, or regulatory state action), and its
remedy (whether damages or equitable relief), are questions disconnected
from the personality, capacity, or other characteristics of the plaintiff.0 7 It
is neither helpful nor interesting to courts assessing constitutional standing
to inquire who Zoya is beyond the question whether the injury she pre-
sents happened to her.°8
In addition to these constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court
has imposed three additional limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts.9
These compose the concept of prudential standing. Prudential standing is
not a constitutional requirement and therefore may be revised or elimi-
nated by Congress or the Court itself. It is normally conceived as
addressing three concerns: the standing of third parties, generalized griev-
ances, and the so-called "zone of interests." Two of these three may be
dismissed quickly. Zoya does not seek to litigate on behalf of a third
party-her injury is clearly her own. Nor does Zoya present what has been
termed a generalized grievance: her claim is not shared by an undifferenti-
ated mass of potential litigants. Only the Feruza Caf6 was demolished.
The sixth standing requirement-the zone-of-interests test of pruden-
tial standing-was a concomitant result of a revolution in standing
doctrine as a whole. In 1970, the Supreme Court announced a change from
the existing "legal interest" test in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp."0 Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court rejected
injured that must be legally protectable. (Likewise, the redressability question is not asking whether
this plaintiff is entitled to a judicial remedy, but whether a court has the ability to remedy the type of
injury claimed.) The reason for this confusion might be the origin of the injury-in-fact test, which
owes much to the same opinion that gave birth to the zone-of-interests test, Ass 'n of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See William V. Dorsaneo, II, The
Enigma of Standing Doctrine in Texas Courts, 28 REv. LITIG. 35, 40 (2008) ("In Camp, the Court
replaced the traditional notion that a person was required to have a cause of action--or an injury in
law-with the considerably more lenient, but nonetheless abstract, idea that the claimant was re-
quired to have sustained an injury in fact.").
107. Or, at least, they should be. For an examination of the confusion between standing and
capacity to sue, see Dorsaneo, supra note 106.
108. Lujan, 505 U.S. at 561-62 ("When the suit is one challenging the legality of government
action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment
stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether
the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily
little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or
requiring the action will redress it.").
109. Several courts of appeals have concluded that, unlike constitutional standing (which must
exist throughout the course of the litigation and may be argued at any stage, with the result that
jurisdiction may be lost) prudential-standing concerns may either be "bypassed," see, e.g., Erie
Forge & Steel, Inc. v. Erie Forge & Steel, Inc., 418 F.3d 270, 275 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005); McNamara v.
City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998); or "pretermitted," see, e.g., Grubbs v. Bailes,
445 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 2006); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10
(11 th Cir. 1999), in favor of resolving the merits, or that the argument is waived if not presented in
the court below, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007).
110. 397 U.S. 150. Data processors sought to enjoin a rule by the Comptroller of the Currency
to permit banks to engage in data processing services, but would have lacked standing to do so
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the old "legal interest" test as one going "to the merits. The question of
standing is different."''. To understand the revolutionary nature of this
change, a brief historical snapshot is helpful.
2. Legal Injury, Injury in Fact, and Zone of Interests
For obvious reasons, courts have always focused on the nature of a liti-
gant's alleged injury. Although the term "standing" was not fully adopted
by the Supreme Court to connote constitutional and other requirements for
jurisdiction until well into the twentieth century," 2 the "gist" of the idea
had always at least revolved around asking whether the plaintiff could al-
lege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."' 3 For
much of American history, the various writs and causes of action derived
from English common law policed this boundary, as did a related sense of
access to justice governed by both legal and equitable processes.' 4 In a
case that decided the ownership of what became Arlington National Ceme-
tery (ironically, a takings claim that arose out of the confiscation of an
estate belonging to the wife of General Robert E. Lee), the Court ex-
plained the requirements with straightforward language, and without using
the word "standing":
In the case supposed, the court has before it a plaintiff capable of suing,
a defendant who has no personal exemption from suit, and a cause of ac-
tion cognizable in the court-a case within the meaning of that term, as
employed in the Constitution and defined by the decisions of this court.
It is to be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction of the court that the plain-
tiff may be able to prove the right which he asserts in his declaration." 5
All that was required in order to sue was a legal injury alleged by someone
with the capacity to sue (i.e., someone with the legal ability to sue and be
under the old "legal interest" test: neither the Comptroller nor banks benefiting from the rule change
had infringed any legal right of the plaintiffs.
11. Id. at 153.
112. Sunstein, supra note 101, at 169, 180. Professor Sunstein located the first use of the term
connoting an Article m requirement in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). Professor Winter
found it in a Frankfurter concurrence five years earlier in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460
(1939). Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1988). For my purposes, it really doesn't matter when the term shifted in mean-
ing. The shift itself is the important thing.
113. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). I say "at least" because of the historical debate
over the relevance to the question of standing doctrines of citizen suits, qui tam relator actions, and
suits by strangers for the public benefit in English and early American law. See Louis L. Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Winter, supra
note 112.
114. TRIBE, supra note 101, at 393; Sunstein, supra note 101, at 168-79; Winter, supra note
112, at 1395.
115. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882).
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sued in that judicial forum). 116 This legal injury was nothing more than the
violation of some legal right (whether derived from constitutional, statu-
tory, or common law) that the courts could then redress." 7 Whether this
requirement was met was a question on the merits, not a question of juris-
diction."8
The dramatic changes in American society that began in the late nine-
teenth century radically changed the concept of standing in American
law." 9 Congress made access to court easier, thus expanding the dockets of
120federal courts. Procedural reform movements culminated in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and with them a difficult transition from a legal
world defined by causes of action and a split between legal and equitable
jurisdiction, to one of "claims," "notice pleading," and the unified legal
and equitable jurisdiction of federal courts. 21 Most significantly, the emer-
gence of an administrative regulatory state further overwhelmed already
swollen dockets with more federal lawsuits to defend the statutory rights
and other entitlements created and increasingly controlled by government
agencies.
22
These cases did more than swamp court dockets. They also sowed con-
fusion by introducing new types of legal relationships and categories of
conflict that had not existed before. 23 Something had to give in a world in
which government was increasingly the defendant (by virtue of its far-
reaching regulatory oversight and provision of entitlements) but injuries
116. For an analysis of this conceptual confusion in the Texas courts, see Dorsaneo, supra
note 106, at 58-69.
117. William Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights are Vio-
lated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 60 (1985);
see also Sunstein, supra note 101, at 170.
118. General Inv. Co. v. N.Y Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1926) ("Whether a plain-
tiff seeking such relief has the requisite standing is a question going to the merits, and its
determination is an exercise of jurisdiction. If it be resolved against him, the appropriate decree is a
dismissal for want of merits, not for want of jurisdiction." (internal citations omitted)).
119. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006) ("No-
tions of standing have changed in ways to induce apoplexy in an eighteenth-century lawyer."), revd
on other grounds, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
120. Winter, supra note 112, at 1452 (citing the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, §§ 1-2, 18
Stat. 470-73 (1875) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006))).
121. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
122. See Burnham, supra note 117, at 69-70 (describing changes in the "overall statutory
topography" of the country that led to a "revolution in social awareness of environmental quality,"
and the judicial recognition of environmental well-being and even aesthetic injuries sufficient for
standing to sue).
123. Winter, supra note 112, at 1452-53 ("[T]he growth in the federal workload and the
search for limits coincided with the systemization of the law of equity, from which standing law
grew. Starting as a question of entred to equity jurisdiction, 'standing' could, in a time of severe
docket pressures, naturally evolve into a doctrine about entree into the federal court system itself."
(internal citation omitted)). Professor Winter also considers renewed attention to the concept of
damnum absque injuria, the rise of liberalism and an emphasis on the private rights of individuals,
and the political conflicts of the New Deal Supreme Court as additional important factors in the
conceptual shift in standing. Id. at 1453-55.
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alleged by plaintiffs did not fit squarely into old categories of legal inter-
ests-e.g., suits to enjoin allegedly unlawful rate setting, rule making or
other government programs adversely affecting their interests but not cog-
nizable in the old causes of action. That something was the former refusal
to hear a litigant "unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of prop-
erty, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or
one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.' 24 In a series of revo-
lutionizing Supreme Court opinions, the law of standing shifted from its
common law legal interest origins to a focus on "injury in fact" as a con-
stitutional requirement derived from the "case or controversy" limitation
of Article III.
The leading case in that revolution was Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp. 25 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, announced that standing inquiries seek answers to two separate
questions. First, whether "the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."'' 26 This first ques-
tion overturned the long-standing view that standing required a legally
cognizable interest (most obviously in the form of a cause of action for the
invasion of a legal right). The second question was whether "the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question."' 27 If these questions were affirmatively answered, then
the plaintiff had standing to sue. Only then does a court ask the "questions
which go to the merits"-what, if anything, gives the plaintiff a legal in-
. 128
terest that the defendant may have violated.
The Camp case was a high water mark for liberal rules that led in short
course to standing for a student group united in the shared injuries of
"pay[ing] more for finished products, ... breath[ing polluted] air .... and
pay[ing] increased taxes," all allegedly the result of increased railroad
freight surcharges. '29 Unsurprisingly, the case provoked a reaction. It was
not long before standing doctrine, although still employing the "injury in
fact" language of Camp, was strengthened. Ten years later, the Supreme
Court denied judicial review to individual consumers of milk who sought
on that basis to challenge price regulations of certain dairy products.'30 The
124. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
125. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (a companion
case).
126. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 152.
127. Id. at 153.
128. Id. at 158.
129. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 679 (1973).
130. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). The Court of Appeals held that the
milk drinkers had standing: they had suffered an injury in fact (market regulations denied them the
ability to buy "a nutritious dairy beverage at a lower price than fresh drinking milk") caused by the
Agriculture Secretary's price regulations and this could be redressed by a favorable ruling. Cmty.
Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court concluded that
March 20 101
Michigan Law Review
consumers were held, essentially, to be outside the zone of interests Con-
gress intended its statute to cover. Eight years after that, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife signaled heightened judicial scrutiny of seemingly
broad legislative extensions of standing to sue to "any persons" for proce-
dural injuries in the process of adopting rules or administering federal
programs."' Unless the procedural injury could be tied to some other
threatened concrete interest, the citizen-suit provision could not override
the requirement that the plaintiff show more than a mere generalized
grievance.13
It will be noted that the zone-of-interests test appeared and was pre-
dominantly employed in the analysis of standing in the context of statutory
rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court explicitly extended the test to
constitutional rights, too. 33 And constitutional causes of action have been
evaluated under the zone-of-interests test. A recent example is helpful.
When a public school cut costs by dismissing three teachers and contract-
ing with a religious school to fulfill their duties, the teachers sought
damages under the Establishment Clause. The Sixth Circuit held that the
mere fact that the teachers claimed an economic injury, rather than some
spiritual one, "does not put them outside the zone of interests .... These
teachers lost their jobs when their secular positions were outsourced to a
religious institution, a type of harm that clearly falls within the zone of
interests defined by an amendment meant to keep government neutral and
secular."'' 4
The court assessed the plaintiffs' zone-of-interests standing according
to their claim of injury, not by asking whether the Establishment Clause
was intended to cover teachers as a class or these particular teachers per
se. As will be seen in the next section, misapplication of the concept of a
zone of interests lies at the heart of the problems that the prior substantial-
connections test of prudential standing creates.
3. Substantial Connections as a Zone of Interests
Zoya's case fell prey to the merging of the (originally merits-based) sub-
stantial-connections test and a jurisdictional inquiry, the zone-of-interests
prudential standing requirement. As noted above, two courts held that Zoya
lacked prudential standing because-as someone with no prior substantial
Congress did not intend for consumers to have a judicial remedy to its rate making and elected not
to address the appellate court's standing analysis. Block, 467 U.S. at 353 n.4.
131. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
132. Id. at 573. This holding threw into confusion whether a generalized grievance presented
an issue of constitutional or prudential standing. See ERWIN CHEMER1NSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
97-98 (5th ed. 2007); Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule
of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 952-59 (2008). Resolution of this problem is not relevant to
this article.
133. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153).
134. Smith v. Jefferson County Sch. Bd. of Comm'rs, 549 F.3d 641, 651-52 (6th Cir. 2008).
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connection to the United States-her claim fell outside the zone of interests
of the Takings Clause. I think her complaint was wrongly dismissed because
the substantial-connections test results in two separate errors when it is ap-
plied to assess the zone-of-interests facet of prudential standing.
First, it assigns the wrong meaning to the phrase "zone of interests." We
ask whether Zoya's claim is within the zone of interests the Constitution
addresses, not whether Zoya herself is within the Constitution's zone of in-
terests writ large. In other words, it is the grievance, the injury complained
of, not the injured complainant, that must be within the zone of interests.
Thus, the Court has repeatedly indicated that under the test "the plaintiff
must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the ad-
verse effect upon him) falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be
protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis
for his complaint."'
' 35
The zone-of-interests test is, simply, a zone of interests, not a zone of
plaintiffs. Applied correctly, the zone-of-interests test would find that Zoya's
loss of property is within the zone of interests of the Takings Clause-the
uncompensated seizure of property is precisely what the Takings Clause is
all about. The test is applied incorrectly when it is misused to inquire pre-
maturely whether some individual or class of individuals is within the zone
of interests of a constitutional provision. Although a court might ultimately
hold that the Takings Clause does not extend to Uzbekistan or even to Zoya
herself, that is a decision on the merits of the claim, not a jurisdictional
holding supportable by any known doctrine of standing.
Second, it falls prey to a common error in standing cases: it confuses a
jurisdictional inquiry with the merits. Although the courts held Zoya lacked
standing to sue, they did so by making conclusions about the merits of her
claim. This conflation of jurisdiction and the merits is one to which zone-of-
interests analyses are particularly susceptible. This may be, in part, because
the vast majority of such inquiries are made in the context of interpreting
statutory rights in an administrative law context. Indeed, the zone-of-
interests prudential-standing inquiry has sometimes been called "statutory
standing."' 36 In that statutory context, Justice Scalia noted in Steel:
The question whether this plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute,
and the question whether any plaintiff has a cause of action under the stat-
ute are closely connected-indeed, depending upon the asserted basis for
lack of statutory standing, they are sometimes identical, so that it would be
exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the two.137
Another way to perceive this confusion of merits-based versus jurisdic-
tional inquiries is to approach the issue with reference to the classic elements
of a cause of action: duty, breach, causation, damages. Extraterritorial claims
135. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517,
523-24 (1991) (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 883).
136. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).
137. Id. at 97 n.2.
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most directly raise the element of duty.'38 After all, what motivates the stand-
ing inquiry is the suspicion that the United States owes no constitutionally
derived duty to foreign citizens on foreign soil. To succeed, Zoya must show
that the United States owed her a duty. That may depend on who Zoya is
and where she is located, both of which are factual inquiries. But resolution
of the duty element requires a decision on the merits of Zoya's claim, not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. 13 This is a question of the validity of a
cause of action, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction. 4The former
argument lies at the heart of a 12(b)(6) motion; the latter is a lack-of-
standing argument. The Constitution may be construed to provide a cause of
action; then again, it might be construed otherwise. That plaintiff's view of
the law might not ultimately persuade a court, except in the most extreme
cases, simply has nothing to do with the court's jurisdiction or the plaintiff's
standing.
14
This view, formed in the crucible of statutory rights, has led the lower
courts to an error that is particularly dangerous when applied to constitu-
tional rights. Judge Posner, for example, citing the Steel case, stated that
"The latter type of jurisdictional issue ('prudential standing' as it is some-
times called) may be bypassed in favor of deciding the merits when the
outcome is unaffected and the merits issue easier than the jurisdictional is-
sue."'142 In its more extreme form, the error takes the shape of deriving lack
of standing to sue from the legal conclusion that the plaintiff lacks a consti-
tutional right. That is backward, as then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
138. Some might say Zoya has simply asserted the wrong cause of action. She should not
have alleged a Fifth Amendment taking, but rather a violation of her right to property under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Regardless of the cause of action, however, the element of duty
remains the foremost obstacle to the success of her claim. From the point of view of standing, "a
word game played by secret rules," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
redefinition of the injury may often make all the difference in proving standing. Burnham, supra
note 117, at 73-76.
139. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a
proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdic-
tion. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of
law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdic-
tion over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the
allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on
the merits, not for want of jurisdiction"). At least in cases in which a constitutional remedy is clear,
even the dissenters agreed on this point. Id. at 685 (Stone, C.J., & Burton, J., dissenting) ("When the
provision of the Constitution or federal statute affords a remedy which may in some circumstances
be availed of by a plaintiff, the fact that his pleading does not bring him within that class as one
entitled to the remedy, goes to the sufficiency of the pleading and not to the jurisdiction.").
140. Steel, 523 U.S. at 89 ("It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts'
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.").
141. Id. ("Rather, the district court has jurisdiction if 'the right of the petitioners to recover
under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given
one construction and will be defeated if they are given another,' unless the claim 'clearly appears to
be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is
wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" (internal citation omitted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-85 (1946))).
142. McNamara v. City of Chi., 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998).
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observed with evident frustration, dissenting in a case concerning the First
Amendment rights of foreign, nongovernmental family planning organiza-
tions:
I am unable sensibly to distinguish the [district] court's "standing" and
"merits" dispositions. The two become one under the "merits first" ap-
proach adopted, i.e., first the court decides the foreign NGOs "had no First
Amendment rights," therefore the court concludes those NGOs had "no
standing to assert a violation of such rights."'43
Zoya's case offers an excellent illustration of these two errors and how
badly the injection of this new prior substantial-connections test for pruden-
tial standing can confuse the issues before the court. The Government's brief
led to confusion from the start. Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager were the
twin hooks on which the Government hung its standing argument. The
United States read those cases to establish the "rule" that a foreign citizen
without a substantial connection to the United States lacked standing to al-
lege a constitutional injury.'" But while Eisentrager directly addressed the
question whether enemy aliens have standing, neither the phrase "prior sub-
stantial connections" nor a test of standing on that basis appears in that
case.14 Likewise, the word "standing" did not even appear in Verdugo-
Urquidez-a case decided on the merits.
Plaintiff's brief in opposition did not inject much clarity to the issue. On
the one hand, plaintiff's counsel identified the "issue presented" as whether
their client "has standing to bring suit" against the United States for taking
her property. 46 On the other hand, counsel blurred this jurisdictional issue
with the merits of plaintiff's cause of action, characterizing the Govern-
ment's ground for dismissal as arguing that "absent 'substantial connections'
143. DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. U.S. Mot., supra note 30, at 6. The United States argued that plaintiff's lack of standing
warranted dismissal pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
145. Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court ties the question of standing inextricably to mul-
tiple factors associated with military jurisdiction in a time of war:
The foregoing demonstrates how much further we must go if we are to invest these enemy ali-
ens, resident, captured and imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand access to our courts.
We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled,
as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus.
To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitu-
tionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided
in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody
as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the
United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and
is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). Although the Court framed the matter with the
term "standing," the nature of the writ of habeas corpus at issue-simultaneously a question of
jurisdiction and substantive constitutional right-further strains the focus on standing.
146. Plaintiff Zoya Atamirzayeva's Opposition to the United States' Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 2, Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (2007) (No. 05-01245 L).
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with the United States, the Government owes no duty of compensation
whatsoever when it takes property located abroad from an alien."'' 47 Counsel
did not challenge the propriety of this elision of the merits with jurisdiction,
but instead chose to distinguish each case on its facts: Eisentrager con-
cemed only enemy aliens, while Verdugo-Urquidez concerned only the
Fourth Amendment.48 As noted above, this choice is perhaps understandable
given the confused state of the court's case law.' 9 Plaintiff's counsel appar-
ently judged one of those cases, Turney v. United States, to offer the best
chance of success and urged the court to follow that precedent to hold that
their client was entitled to compensation.
The opinion of the Court of Federal Claims started well enough, noting
the distinction between constitutional and prudential components of stand-
ing. It correctly concluded that constitutional standing was "not the issue
here," and that "the focus of the prudential standing inquiry is on the plain-
tiff's position-as it is in the instant case."'5 ° But the court then erroneously
assigned the wrong meaning to the zone-of-interests inquiry. Notwithstand-
ing an acknowledgment that "the issue of standing is technically irrelevant
in Verdugo-Urquidez,"'' the court accepted the United States' invitation to
import the substantial-connections test from it for this new purpose, assert-
ing that standing was analogous to the issue presented in that criminal case.
Adopting the test, the court made clear the shift in the type of question it
perceived itself to be answering, "In other words, the question in a standing
inquiry is 'May this person argue in court that the United States is responsi-
ble for a taking?'-not, 'Does the Takings Clause apply in these
circumstances?' ,15' The court derived this view of prudential standing from
Warth v. Seldin, which it cited for the proposition that the standing inquiry
required the court to ask "whether the constitutional or statutory provision
on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in
the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."'53
But the court clearly misconceived what the phrase "plaintiff's position"
meant. As noted above, it does not mean that one inquires into the personal
characteristics of the individual. Nor does it mean a sotto voce conclusion
that the Constitution does not extend to foreigners-a conclusion on the
merits hidden in the guise of the jurisdictional question of standing. The
"position" in question is only relevant to the question of whether the plain-
tiff should be invoking judicial relief rather than the aid of the political
branches. In other words, it goes to the core question, the "gist" of standing:
whether the plaintiff is in a position to allege "such a personal stake in the
147. Id. at 1.
148. Id.
149. See supra Section I.A.
150. Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 382.
151. Id. at 383.
152. Id. at 382.
153. Id. at 383 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
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outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.1 54
This first error made commission of the second error-blurring the ju-
risdictional question with the merits question-almost inevitable. The court
reached the conclusion that Zoya lacked standing by determining that the
Takings Clause did not extend to her-a decision about the merits of her
cause of action.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit framed the "sole
question presented on appeal" as "whether a foreign citizen with no connec-
tion to the United States has a right to just compensation under the Fifth• ,,155
Amendment for a taking of property that occurs in a foreign country. This
again conflated two distinct issues: the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's holding that Zoya lacked standing to sue-a jurisdictional ques-
tion-while engaging the merits of Zoya's cause of action. Notwithstanding
this conflation of standing to sue with the possession of rights, the court
appeared to focus on the substantive question of the extraterritorial reach of
the Takings Clause, and after a lengthy disquisition of Supreme Court pre-
cedents concerning the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution (only one of
156
which was a decision about the standing of litigants), Judge Bryson af-
firmed the decision of the trial court, including its reading of Turney.
This was error. As Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court,
"It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed
to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction,
i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.' 5 7 It
154. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). An alternative way of framing the same issue is
found in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968): "In other words, when standing is placed in
issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Whether
framed as the right "position" or the right "party," the purpose of that framework is not to determine
whether plaintiff is within some zone of coverage of the statutory or constitutional provision. Ra-
ther, as the Court noted:
[T]he question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will
be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party
invoking federal court jurisdiction has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and
whether the dispute touches upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
Id. at 101 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
155. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
Since the trial court held that Zoya lacked standing, this formulation is incorrect. See supra note 36.
156. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1322-26. Of all of the cases cited in this section, only Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776-77 (1950), actually concerned the issue of standing. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (criminal appeal); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957) (habeas corpus); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) (habeas corpus); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (criminal appeal); Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (jurisdiction under predecessor to the Reciprocity Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2502 (2006)); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (libel prosecution); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904) (libel prosecution); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (habeas corpus);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (duties claim); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (habeas
corpus); Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891) (criminal appeal).
157. Steel v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
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might well be that Zoya cannot recover under her stated cause of action, but
"[t]his Court held [in Bell v. Hood] that the nonexistence of a cause of action
was no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal."1 8 The possibility that a
judicial construction of the Fifth Amendment would frustrate her prayer for
relief and result in the defeat of Zoya's claim on the merits, unless the claim
were "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," does not mean that a court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the claim."' To subsume the merits of her claim into a
test for jurisdiction is worse than putting the cart before the horse-it puts
the horse inside the very cart itself, for a conclusion about the merits of the
claim is used as proof that the plaintiff lacks standing!
This was easier for the Federal Circuit to perceive when its vision was
not clouded by the mesmerizing question of standing. A separate panel of
the Federal Circuit reaffirmed this bedrock principle distinguishing inquiries
into jurisdiction and the merits just three weeks before the Atamirzayeva
panel upheld the lower court's dismissal for lack of standing (conflating the
two inquiries). In Jan's Helicopter Service v. FAA, the Federal Circuit re-
solved its jurisdiction over a regulatory takings claim the opposite way. 60 In
so doing, it reaffirmed a far more established line of precedent behind its
Tucker Act jurisdiction, which requires "a separate source of substantive law
that creates the right to money damages.'' It is well established that the
Takings Clause is just such a source of substantive law. 62 Having established
that money-mandating source of law, the court has established its jurisdic-
tion. The court then "asks only whether the plaintiff is within the class of
plaintiffs entitled to recover under the statute if the elements of a cause of
action are established."'163 In the context of the Takings Clause, this is an
easy question to answer "because appellants, having alleged a taking of their
158. Id. at 96.
159. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). As the Bell Court said long ago, and the
current Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed:
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that
the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.
For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of
action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be
decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the
court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do
not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of
jurisdiction.... Thus, the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sus-
tained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be
defeated if they are given another. For this reason the district court has jurisdiction.
Id. at 682, 685; see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006); Steel, 523 U.S. at
89.
160. See 525 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
161. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part).
162. Jan's Helicopter Serv. v. FAA, 525 F.3d at 1309 ("It is undisputed that the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating source for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdic-
tion.").
163. Id. at 1308 (citing Greenlee County v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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property by the government, are within the class of plaintiffs entitled to re-
covery if a takings claim is established."' 6
The court should not consider the actual merits of the claim to determine
its jurisdiction. This was a point so important that Judge Dyk placed it en-
tirely in italics: "Only after this initial inquiry is completed and the Court of
Federal Claims takes jurisdiction over the case does it consider the facts
specific to the plaintiff's case to determine 'whether on the facts [the plain-
tiff's] claim f[alls] within the terms of the statutes.' ,, If, upon examining
the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the court concludes "that plaintiff's case
does not fit within the scope of the source" of the court's jurisdiction-in
this case, the Takings Clause-then "the consequence of a ruling by the
court ... is simply this: plaintiff loses on the merits for failing to state a
claim on which relief can be granted."' 66
Looked at from this perspective, it is obvious that the "substantial con-
nection" standing argument injected needless confusion into Zoya's case.
Zoya, like the plaintiffs in Jan's Helicopter, asserted that the Court of Fed-
eral Claims had subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491; both plaintiffs presented causes of action under the Takings
Clause.
167
Zoya's petition for rehearing en banc was denied.6 6 But that petition
highlighted the confusion that prudential standing had introduced into the
case. Petitioner-plaintiff continued to identify the case as one to be decided
based on Circuit precedent, the Turney decision. Zoya's counsel went to
considerable lengths to show that the real party in interest in that case, like
Zoya, had no substantial connection to the United States. Among their ar-
guments was the fact that Turney, a U.S. citizen, was appointed trustee of
the Filipino corporation "after the complaint was filed."'69
This was an important point for counsel, as their added italics indicated,
because counsel read this to mean that the panel had held that "conduct the
plaintiff takes after filing its complaint can perfect a Takings claim and cre-
ate a sufficient connection with the United States to withstand dismissal.
That position is contrary to both law and logic."'7° Of course, that would be
true if standing were not a matter of jurisdiction. But if a plaintiff must
maintain standing at all times during the pendency of the action for a court
to maintain jurisdiction, both law and logic might be quite different when
viewed through the prism of standing, rather than the merits of the case
164. Id. at 1309.
165. Id. at 1308 (quoting Greenlee County, 487 F.3d at 876).
166. Id. at 1307 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1175-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
167. Compare Compl., supra note 17, at 1, with Amended Complaint for Just Compensation
at$ 7, Jan's Helicopter Serv. v. United States, No. 08-671C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 17, 2008).
168. See supra note 37.
169. Plaintiff-Appellant Mrs. Zoya Atamirzayeva's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6,
Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-5159) [hereinafter Plain-
tiff-Appellant's Petition].
170. Id.
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itself. And when the prism is prudential standing, not the constitutional
standing required by Article III for courts to exercise their subject matter
jurisdiction, the issue is even further confused. 7' This subtlety was missed
by plaintiff's counsel, who cited Supreme Court cases regarding constitu-
tional standing for the proposition that conduct that occurs after a complaint
12is filed can confer neither jurisdiction nor standing.
III. WHEN SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?
Not only is the substantial-connections test in conflict with the standing
inquiry it purports to facilitate, it is inconsistent with any coherent view of
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. Section III.A exposes these
inconsistencies. Section III.B addresses concerns about the practical effect
of depriving courts of this tool to control their jurisdiction. This Article is
grounded in the assumption that it is critically important to keep a judicial
forum open to resolve questions about when the Constitution should follow
the flag, asked by those with constitutional standing to do so, whether citi-
zens or foreigners. A judicially created rule that denies prudential standing
to those best placed to allege governmental excesses, be they real or imag-
ined or even ultimately nonjusticiable, is a rule that serves no useful purpose
171. There is no consensus about when standing must be established or how long it must
remain. This is largely caused by the connection made between standing and the jurisdiction of
federal courts. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 919 (9th ed. 2007) ("The
[standing] requirements must be satisfied at every stage of a federal court proceeding, from the
initiation of the suit to its final review in the Supreme Court."). But see Cleveland Branch, NAACP
v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[Clontrary to the district court's conclusion,
standing does not have to be maintained throughout all stages of litigation. Instead, it is to be deter-
mined as of the time the complaint is filed.").
In the context of adjudicating patent disputes, for example, the courts are split regarding
whether assignments of interest may retroactively perfect standing to sue. See, e.g., Randolph-Rand
Corp. v. Shafmaster Co., No. CIV 97-44-M, 1999 WL 814367, at *2 (D.N.H. Apr. 8, 1999); Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 305, 309-10 (D. Del. 1995). In other
litigation, courts have also permitted retroactive, corrective filings to establish standing (and thus
jurisdiction). See, e.g., Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Clifton, Civ. A. No. 89-3238, 1990 WL
238665, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 1990) ("[I]f plaintiffs have fulfilled the requirements of [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(d), the Court will consider whether standing exists on the basis of the
amended complaint."). Where the standing in question is prudential, not constitutional, the grounds
for permitting or prohibiting the inclusion of postfiling events to establish standing are clouded even
further. This is, again, linked to jurisdiction. Since prudential standing is discretionary, not required,
the rationale that jurisdiction must be established at the initiation of the action is not well grounded.
From a practical standpoint, this approach may also be quite disruptive and expensive. Years may
pass and considerable lucre wasted in litigation that culminates in the final appeal with a successful
jurisdictional argument to dismiss for lack of prudential standing. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). "Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particu-
larly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful." Grupo Dataflux v.
Atlas Global Group, 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (discussing the time-of-filing rule for diversity juris-
diction).
172. Counsel cited Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n.5 (1992), for this
proposition. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition, supra note 169, at 6-7. But both of those cases
concerned constitutional standing, not prudential standing, and therefore they are not authority for
the issue most pressing to plaintiff Atamirzayeva (who lacked prudential standing). Friends of the
Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
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in American constitutional law, regardless of one's view of the extraterrito-
rial reach of the Constitution.
A. The Extraterritorial Constitution and Substantial Connections
The story of America's changing conceptions of the reach of its Consti-
tution has been told frequently and elsewhere by many scholars and courts
and need not be recited again here.'73 For purposes of this Article, it is worth
noting the protean nature of the story itself. 7 4 It should be unsurprising that,
as America changed from a hardscrabble outpost of colonists to an inde-
pendent sovereign state, to a regional power, to an imperial power, to a Cold
War superpower, the perceived reach of the Constitution has changed, too.
There was little need to worry about the power of federal officials to affect
the lives of citizens or foreigners abroad when an urgent response to a for-
eign crisis meant congressional authorization to establish a permanent navy
consisting of no more than six frigates.'75 That concern changed as America
'76did, with the most extreme changes occurring in the twentieth century. ' A
navy of six frigates has grown to one of six fleets.
77
As the United States grew in size and power, its courts were confronted
with claims of litigants at home and abroad. How was the Constitution to be
understood to apply to foreigners and citizens in American states, federal
territories destined for statehood, far-off territorial possessions, and in other
sovereign states? The easiest approach was to draw the boundaries of consti-
tutional inclusion by reference to geography (the "territorial" premise).
Immigration and the growth of American expatriate communities abroad led
to caveats defined by citizenship or residency (the "social compact" prem-
ise). As the capacity to project American power grew, especially in the
twentieth century, courts resolved constitutional questions with pragmatic
tests of various formulations (the functional premise).
173. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253-58 (2008); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996);
Kermit Roosevelt Il, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
2017, 2042-59 (2005). My taxonomy draws heavily on the work of Neuman and Roosevelt. A very
recent monograph by Kal Raustiala, although unfortunately published too late to have been con-
sulted in the drafting of this Article, also deserves mention. Kal Raustiala, DOES THE CONSTITUTION
FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009).
174. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 3 ("The domain of U.S. constitutionalism has always been
contested, and it has grown as the nation has grown.").
175. Naval Act of 1794, ch. 12, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 350 (authorizing the president "to provide, by
purchase or otherwise, equip and employ four ships to carry forty-four guns each, and two ships to
carry thirty-six guns each."). The sole purpose of the Act was to defeat Barbary Pirates who har-
assed American shipping; the Act self-terminated "if a peace shall take place between the United
States and the Regency of Algiers." Id. sec. 9.
176. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253 ("[T]hroughout most of our history there was little need
to explore the outer boundaries of the Constitution's geographic reach .... Fundamental questions
regarding the Constitution's geographic scope first arose at the dawn of the 20th century... ").
177. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets are currently active compo-
nents of the United States Navy. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, http://www.cusns.navy.mil
numberedfleets.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
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The prior substantial-connections test of prudential standing is consis-
tent with none of these constitutional theories. Return one last time to
Zoya's caf6 to consider how this doctrinal test is completely untethered from
these constitutional options. To recap: the test is straightforward in its appli-
cation. Notwithstanding her allegations that the United States destroyed her
livelihood by seizing her property, Zoya's connection to the United States is
held to be too insubstantial to give her standing to sue. She is a foreigner,
outside of and without ties to the United States. She is, the logic goes, there-
fore outside the zone of interests of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the basis for her constitutional cause of action. U.S. courts are
closed to her not because of any defect in her cause of action, but because of
a conclusion about the prudence of hearing her in particular plead it. A court
willing to make that determination (and it is a determination that is discre-
tionary, not obligatory) would conclude that Zoya lacks standing, and
therefore the court lacks jurisdiction. Her complaint would be dismissed
with prejudice.
1. A Test Bound Neither By Territory...
Territorialists would say that Zoya has no right to just compensation be-
cause the Constitution does not apply to state action involving aliens
abroad. 7' This conclusion, which "prevailed as dogma for most of American
constitutional history,"'' 79 rests on the premise that the Constitution does not
limit the exercise of federal power abroad, whether with regard to U.S. citi-
zens or noncitizens."8 Territorialists would thus say that Zoya's complaint
should be expeditiously dismissed on the merits: to prolong a lawsuit based
on rights that the plaintiff does not possess would be "a charade at best
pointless, and more likely cruel.""'
It is easy to see why the prior substantial-connections test for standing
fits so poorly with a strictly territorial view of the Constitution.' An honest
territorialist should not care how substantial a connection Zoya had to the
178. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) ("By the constitution a government is
ordained and established 'for the United States of America,' and not for countries outside of their
limits.... The Constitution can have no operation in another country."). Of course, there are obvi-
ous exceptions to this rigid statement of the territorialist position. The plaintiff need not always be
physically present in the United States to be entitled to constitutional protection of her interests. For
example, well settled case law protects property within the United States even though the plaintiff
alleging some legal injury to it is outside the United States. This exception would not apply to Zoya
who, like the property at issue, is in a foreign land.
179. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 7.
180. This view regarding citizens was overruled by Reid v. Coven, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957),
which held that the Constitution extends to protect U.S. citizens abroad. As to Ross, the Reid Court
was dismissive: "At best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era." Id. at 12.
181. Roosevelt, supra note 173, at 2020 (describing reasoning based on territorial premise).
182. One might be equally suspicious of the consistency between such a view of the Constitu-
tion and a substantial-connections test applied to the merits of the claim, rather than as a
jurisdictional inquiry. Although the arguments are surely very similar, the substantive question is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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United States if Zoya (or her property) were not in the United States as
those boundaries have been variously defined. Under this test, however, if
Zoya has a substantial enough connection to the United States, then geogra-
phy does not matter. Zoya's standing to sue presents a factual question
affected by "the nature and duration" of her contacts. '8' Such fact-finding isimproper if one believes that the Constitution only has force at home.
2.... Nor By Functionalism...
Some scholars and judges, holding to a theory that the Constitution is a
limit on government power irrespective of where it is exercised, would say
that Zoya's complaint presents a straightforward takings claim that should
be decided on its merits absent a collateral reason to dismiss it. If, for exam-
ple, the litigation would raise a nonjusticiable political question (e.g., the
conduct of the country's foreign relations) or expose state secrets, dismissal
may be appropriate. Reasonable minds may differ on these issues, but they
do not turn on the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. The extent
of Zoya's prior substantial connections with the United States has little if
anything to do with whether her claim would inevitably expose state secrets
or be entangled with issues of national security or foreign affairs.
Proponents of this approach necessarily hold a very different view of the
Constitution than does the territorialist. The Constitution does apply to state
action abroad because it is the only source of power for government offi-
cials. The limited and enumerated powers of the federal government do not
expand or contract according to the caprice of geography or the civic status
of those affected by its actions. As Justice Black observed in Reid v. Covert,
"The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source.' ' 4 This approach may be styled the "limited
government" premise.
In its absolute form, an advocate of a limited government theory of the
Constitution would be hard pressed to explain the accordion-like expansion
and contraction of de facto government authority that results when standing
to sue is based on the personal characteristics of a foreign plaintiff. If the
Constitution proscribes the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation (a command that lacks any obvious textual limit based on
geography or civic classification), then the substantial connection of the
victim of that state action beyond the action itself would appear to be irrele-
vant.
To rest here, however, would be to rest on the shoulders of a straw man,
for the "limited government" premise has rarely if ever been adopted in such
an absolutist form. A variant of this approach, most notably associated with
Justice Kennedy, would take what has been called a functional approach to
the matter. "I take it to be correct, as the plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert
sets forth," he observed in his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez,
183. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006).
184. 354 U.S. at 5-6.
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"that the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether
the actions in question are foreign or domestic."'85 But this foundational
principle is only a starting point for him. Acknowledging the precedents that
traced the development of American power from the Insular Cases to
United States v. Curtiss-Wright to Reid v. Covert, Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that "we must interpret constitutional protections in light of the
undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate
power and authority abroad."'' 86 Adopting the second Justice Harlan's view
expressed in Reid, he eschewed "rigid and abstract" rules in favor of a func-
tional test: the Constitution would follow the flag unless there existed
"conditions and considerations" that would "make adherence to a specific
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous."'87 This is a view that
Justice Kennedy reaffirmed in his majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush:
"[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical
concerns, not formalism."'
18
Thus, the relevant question for Justice Kennedy and others with his
functionalist or pragmatic view of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitu-
tion would be whether the extraterritorial application of the Takings Clause
in this circumstance would be "impracticable and anomalous.' 89 Since Jus-
tice Kennedy concurred in the plurality opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez,
which, he said, did not "depart in fundamental respects" from his own
views,' 9° we might be tempted to suppose that an important "consideration"
185. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. Id. It is worth making a brief digression about the middle case in this triptych, Curtiss-
Wright. Some might be tempted to argue that the constitutional theory described by Justice Suther-
land in this case would deprive Zoya and aliens like her of any remedy for her constitutional claims.
In this case, Justice Sutherland famously held that "the investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). These are inherent powers,
not constitutional ones. Id. Hence, the temptation: when the United States acts abroad, it is not lim-
ited by the Constitution.
This argument is susceptible to criticism from several directions. First, the "powers of external
sovereignty" identified by Justice Sutherland are limited to the "powers to declare and wage war, to
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties." Id.
Perhaps when the United States acts abroad outside of these subject areas, the Constitution does
apply. Indeed, in the very next sentence, Justice Sutherland makes that concession with respect to
U.S. citizens. Id. A second concession follows shortly thereafter: this inherent power over foreign
affairs "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 320. Whatever those may be with regard to aliens simply begs
us to return to the question with which we started. That question, however, cannot be answered by
limiting ourselves to a prudential judgment about the substantiality of prior connections with the
United States. At least, there is nothing in the doctrine of Curtiss-Wright to support such a narrow
and formalistic approach.
187. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S.
at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Bournediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255 (2008).
188. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
189. Id. at 2255.
190. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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for Justice Kennedy were he to examine Zoya's case would be her lack of
prior substantial connections.' 9'
Reasonable minds may differ about the result to which a judgment of
impracticality and anomaly would lead if the inquiry were with regard to the
merits of Zoya's takings claim. But the question cannot be answered with
any fidelity to this functional approach solely by a limited, jurisdictional
inquiry into the degree of connection between the plaintiff and the United
States. Such an inquiry into Zoya's standing (which would consider no other
"objective factors and practical concerns" beyond her personal connection)
would seem to have much more in common with the "formalism" that Jus-
tice Kennedy rejected in Boumediene. At the very least, therefore, the
narrow question of Zoya's prior substantial connections should not lead a
court to deny her standing to sue. Perhaps it should be one of many consid-
erations in assessing the merits of her cause of action. Surely the more
straightforward and consistent approach would be to dismiss the suit for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted rather than for be-
ing the wrong kind of plaintiff.
3.... Nor By Social Compact
At first glance, the intermediate approach of the social compact theory
would seem to offer the best support for a standing exercise that assesses a
plaintiff's prior substantial connections to determine whether the court
should hear her claims of constitutional injury abroad. After all, this theory
is based on a conception of the Constitution as an agreement about govern-
ance over a definable population, and a substantial-connections test seems
well suited to defining that very population deemed to have assented to be
governed under those rules.
This social compact theory, too, ultimately falls short. It does so for
much the same reason that it cannot support the substantial-connections test
in its original, merits-focused form, for there exists a class of government
conduct that "shocks the conscience." Such conduct is so shocking that,
even absent such contacts, proponents of this theory would not only agree
191. It is unclear how Justice Kennedy would approach Zoya's case. Since her petition for a
writ of certiorari was denied without any opinion by Justice Kennedy or other members of the
Court, one is left to pure speculation.
On the one hand, Justice Kennedy did join Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, saying that his views did not "depart in fundamental respects from the opinion of
the Court, which I join." Id. In addition to his application of the "impracticable and anomalous"
standard, Justice Kennedy went out of his way to note his acceptance of "the other persuasive justi-
fications stated by the Court." Id. at 278. Presumably, this included Verdugo-Urquidez's lack of any
prior substantial connections to the United States, no less a "condition[] and consideration[]" that
could render a warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous in this context, even without plac-
ing "any weight on the reference to 'the people' in the Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting
its protections." Id. at 276, 278.
On the other hand, Verdugo-Urquidez was decided on the merits. Even if Justice Kennedy con-
sidered the property owner's connection to the United States to be relevant in determining the
extraterritorial application of the Takings Clause, there is no indication that Justice Kennedy would
apply that reasoning in a jurisdictional inquiry into the plaintiff's standing.
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that the Constitution forbids it but also that it necessarily permits (in fact
promotes as a means of redress) a civil action to be heard on the merits.
Conduct so shocking to the conscience is said to violate due process of
law."'92 This was almost certainly the point of the hypothetical raised by Jus-
tice O'Connor during oral argument in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.'
The question led the Government to argue that a domestically applied
"shocks the conscience" standard of substantive due process would enforce
limits on what American officials could do abroad to obtain admissible evi-
dence in criminal prosecutions back in the United States. This admission by
Assistant Solicitor General Robbins in Verdugo-Urquidez was confined to
the context of the exclusionary rule.
This logic is hardly confinable to the admission of evidence in a crimi-
nal trial. Although it is well established that courts are not barred from
presiding over a prosecution enabled by the "forcible abduction" of the de-
fendant into its jurisdiction (the so-called Ker-Frisbie Doctrine),' 94 a narrow
exception exists for conduct that passes the Rochin "shocks the conscience"
standard. 95 In United States v. Toscanino, the Second Circuit heard a horri-
fying account of the kidnapping, torture, and transport into the United States
of an Italian citizen living in Uruguay by American agents who suspected
him of drug trafficking.' The United States refused to either affirm or deny
192. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
194. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) ("[T]he power of a court to try a person for
crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason
of a 'forcible abduction.'" (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886))). Shirley Collins alleged
that he was "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and [taken]" from his home in Chicago by
Michigan officers for prosecution in Michigan. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520. Frederick Ker alleged that
he was "kidnaped [sic] . .. [and] forcibly and with violence arrested" by an American official in
Lima, Peru, and then kept a "close prisoner" on board ships bound first for Honolulu, then to San
Francisco, and then transferred to Cook County, Illinois, for prosecution. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
195. It should be noted that this exception can also give pause even to those who lean towards
the more restrictive, territorial conception of the limits of the Constitution. Professor Geoffrey S.
Corn says "with qualification" that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause has no extraterrito-
rial application, citing Johnson v. Eisentrager and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. Ten Questions
on National Security, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5011 (2008). The qualification is drawn
from the "shocks the conscience" exception to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine described above. Id. "These
authorities," Professor Corn writes, "all indicate that individual constitutional protections are fun-
damentally linked to nationality or territoriality." Id. But this theory of the Constitution is at odds
with the theory that supports the exception. The "shocks the conscience" exception to the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine that is derived from Rochin v. California is based on an entirely different theory. To
believe that the conduct of U.S. officials abroad could so shock the judicial conscience at home that
a court would find a deprivation of due process is to affirm that the Constitution does not always
have a territorial limit. On the contrary, it is to say that the Constitution may be a source of, and a
limit on, power for U.S. officials regardless of where in the world that power is exercised for it
cannot be exercised in a way that would shock an Article In court.
196. 500 F.2d 267, 268-71 (2d Cir. 1974). Toscanino alleged that over a seventeen-day period
he was denied sleep and nourishment, forced to walk for seven to eight hours at a time, kicked and
beaten, and hurt by pliers applied to his fingers, alcohol flushed into his eyes and nose, other fluids
forced into his anus, and electric shocks applied to his earlobes, toes, and genitals. Toscanino, 500
F.2d at 270. Toscanino alleged that "[t]hroughout this entire period the United States government
and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York prosecuting this case was aware
of the interrogation and did in fact receive reports as to its progress." Id.
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Toscanino's allegations, arguing that they were immaterial to the legal ques-
tion of the court's jurisdiction over his prosecution.'97 In an opinion often
distinguished but never overruled, the Second Circuit held that the Constitu-
tion's protection of due process of law required that "a court [] divest itself
of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as
the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."' 98 The court was uninterested
in the citizenship of the defendant, the locus of the torture done by Ameri-
can agents and supervised by distant U.S. officials, or the substantiality of
the defendant's prior connections.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied that same logic to
civil actions in the course of rejecting a petition for habeas corpus just days
before Verdugo-Urquidez was decided.1°° In Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman,
the petitioner was a Honduran citizen who had escaped from an American
prison camp and fled to Honduras (which did not extradite its citizens). 0'
He alleged that he was kidnapped by U.S. marshals (working in tandem
with Honduran special forces) and tortured by the American officials. The
court ultimately denied habeas relief to the returned fugitive. More signifi-
cantly from the standpoint of the social compact theory, the court assumed
that Matta-Ballesteros could file a Bivens action "alleging violation of his
due process rights. 20 2 The court explicitly took no position on the merits of
such a claim, but certainly assumed that Matta-Ballesteros would have
standing to pursue it in a U.S. court. In fact, in another appeal five years
later in the Ninth Circuit by the same defendant, the Government itself sug-
gested in its brief to the court that "[o]ther remedies, such as a damages
action under [Bivens] are the exclusive means of redress" for the kidnapping11 201
and torture that Matta-Ballesteros continued to allege.
Thus, when a noncitizen outside the United States is the victim of such
conduct at the hands of U.S. officials, a civil suit is possible, substantial con-
nection to the polity or no. This would be a cruel admission by courts and
government if (without ever saying so, before or after Verdugo-Urquidez)
these courts and officials expected that a filter based on prior substantial
197. Id.
198. Id. at 275.
199. This is clear in light of the court's deep interest in examining that question with regard to
Toscanino's claim of unlawful wiretapping. Id. at 279-81.
200. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 262 (7th Cir. 1990). This case was decided
on February 21, 1990. The opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), was
announced on February 28, 1990.
201. 896 F.2d at 256.
202. Id. at 262.
203. Brief for the United States at 20, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 E3d 754 (9th Cir.
1995) (No. 91-50336); see also Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 765 n.6 ("As the government suggests,
the availability of civil damages may be a sufficient remedy for the misconduct alleged by Matta-
Ballesteros." (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971))).
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connections could screen such claims. This exception would then swallow
the rule. But if such a suit is possible, then the Constitution is either no
longer a social compact with a defined people, or it is one in which the peo-
ple have compacted to extend its protections against conscience-shocking
(and thus unconstitutional) conduct by its agents abroad.
Seen in historical context, this result should not be particularly surpris-
ing. Over and over again, one question has repeatedly been raised in the face
of arguments that the Constitution's reach should be restricted, whether by
territoriality, citizenship, social compact, or other limiting criteria. The ques-
tion invariably asks whether an extreme act (usually one of violence) may
be committed by the government against the outsider. In his report on the
Virginia Resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts (in that case con-
cerning the alien within the United States), James Madison complained that:
"If aliens had no rights under the Constitution, they might not only be ban-
ished, but even capitally punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a
fair trial. '1 °'
Two hundred years later, Justice John Paul Stevens asked the same ques-S 201
tion at oral argument in Clark v. Martinez. In that case, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the indefinite detention of two Mariel Cubans. The case
turned on an interpretation of immigration statutes, but Justice Stevens left
the Deputy Solicitor General speechless in an exchange about the extraterri-
torial reach of the Constitution:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Kneedler, can I ask you a question, forgetting
the statutes for a moment-I-which we've already covered at some
length? Just going to your constitutional position, it's clear that a person
who's not been admitted and has been paroled could be excluded forth-
with, summarily, and so forth because he's never been admitted. But does
that person have any protection under the Constitution? Could we shoot
him?
[DEP. SG] KNEEDLER: No, no, surely. What-the-the-
JUSTICE STEVENS: Then what is the protection under the Constitution
that deals-is it the Due Process Clause?
MR. KNEEDLER: Whatever right-in-in a criminal prosecution the Bill
of Rights would apply to that person.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Is he-is he a person within the meaning-
MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. We-our position is not that he's-not that he's
not a person. The question is what-is what process is due.
204. Neuman, supra note 1, at 935-36 (quoting Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolu-
tions, reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 546 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
205. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
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JUSTICE STEVENS: And is he a person who has a right to liberty, enti-
tled to some protection, very, very, very minimal, but there is some
protection to that-that individual.
MR. KNEEDLER: It-depending upon the context. The one protection for
liberty he does-
JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, the context is he got off a boat. We couldn't-
but Cuba won't take him back or-or whatever-wherever he came from.
They can't. And the only thing we can do to keep him out of the country is
to keep him in jail.
MR. KNEEDLER: He has no substantive due process right to be released
into the United States.
JUSTICE STEVENS: He-he doesn't have a right to be released.
But-but you do not contend that we could kill him.
MR. KNEEDLER: No, absolutely not. Absolutely not.206
But why not? Mr. Kneedler never provided a constitutional source of
support for his answer to Justice Stevens's question.
Why was it so difficult to state the source of this person's constitutional
protection? There is something strange in the repeated difficulties that such
a simple question has presented over time.207 Suppose, for instance, that
upon hearing Zoya complain about the seizure of her property, a deranged
clerk at the American embassy summarily seized, tortured, and executed her.
Would Zoya's survivors have any civil remedy for such an act in an Ameri-
can court? As shown above, courts and government officials have both said
yes. What meaning could that possibly have if such a lawsuit, once filed,
were to be dismissed for lack of prudential standing?
B. Two Remaining Concerns
If the preceding analysis persuades the reader to question the legitimacy
of a prior substantial-connections test for prudential standing, two remaining
concerns might nevertheless prevent the reader from supporting its
206. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-25, Clark, 543 U.S. 371 (No. 03-878).
207. Although the context was the question of extraconstitutional executive authority instead
of extraterritorial constitutional reach, a high-ranking official of the Justice Department was
tongue-tied by just such a question in the Steel Seizure case. Judge David A. Pine of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia caught Assistant Attorney General Holmes
Baldridge flat-footed during an injunction hearing that ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). After AAG
Baldridge asserted that "there is no power in the Courts to restrain the President" with an injunctive
order, Judge Pine asked what recourse Baldridge would have from a presidential order that he be
arrested and executed the following day. As Maeva Marcus summarized: "Baldridge floundered for
an answer until Judge Pine observed: 'On the question of the deprivation of your rights you have the
Fifth Amendment; that is what protects you.'" MAEVA MARCUs, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE
CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 117 (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1971).
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abolition. The first concern may be that court dockets will be overwhelmed
by foreign litigants if this discretionary key to access is taken away from
judges. The second concern queries what limits, if any, should be placed on
litigation that (unlike Zoya's case) implicates government action taken in
pursuit of national security.
These concerns, by no means unique to this context, are addressed in
conclusion. Neither concern justifies retaining a test at war with both stand-
ing doctrine and constitutional theory. Furthermore, there are hidden
benefits to the transparency promoted by getting rid of the substantial-
connections test.
1. The Problem of Court Clog
The first concern is the easiest to set to rest. Whenever a proposal to ex-
pand access to courts and tribunals is made, the first criticism is often a
practical one: the "the oft-expressed fear that a 'host of parties' will descend
upon it and render its dockets 'clogged' and 'unworkable.' ,201 It is clearly
the prospect of such litigation that has worried the Supreme Court when
confronted with extraterritorial claims in the past.2°9
The argument is practically self-refuting. The answer to the threat of
court clog is not to create an arbitrary device to exclude plaintiffs with le-
gitimate claims. The answer is to expand the capacity of courts. In any
event, it is hard to see how the criticism has any traction: whether the mo-
tion to dismiss is for lack of standing or for some other reason, the motion
will be submitted and must be decided. A fact-intensive inquiry into the sub-
stantiality of connections does not lend itself to quick disposition.1
Indeed, anyone with a genuine fear that foreign litigants would over-
whelm American courts should welcome the end of this strange standing
test, for once it is removed courts will increasingly reach the merits of extra-
territorial claims. Some clauses of the Constitution may be held to extend
beyond our shores while others will be held to have only domestic applica-
tion. Whatever the conclusion of the courts, those merits-based decisions
will have the effect of decreasing some foreign litigation, expediting judicial
review of other foreign claims, or they may have no more or less effect than
the present system. This is so because this case law will inform litigants
whether going to court is likely to be worth the expense. Such case law
208. Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
209. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) ("Were respondent to
prevail, aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy
claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters.").
210. Economic realities, especially salient in long-distance litigation, may be an independent
dampener. Office of Commc'n, 359 F.2d at 1006 ("The fears of regulatory agencies that their proc-
esses will be inundated by expansion of standing criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining
factor is the expense of participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which will
operate to limit the number of those who will seek participation; legal and related expenses of ad-
ministrative proceedings are such that even those with large economic interests find the costs
burdensome.").
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would also presumably have a valuable informative effect on prospective
government action. If, for example, the Takings Clause is held not to extend
to the claims of noncitizen plaintiffs regarding property abroad, then courts
will quickly be able to dismiss such claims without any need for further in-
quiry. If the opposite conclusion is reached, one would expect greater
respect to be shown by American officials for the property interests of aliens
abroad, respect born out of knowledge that constitutional liability might
result from their decisions. Isn't that what we mean when we say that rules
affect behavior?
Might a decision on the merits that the Takings Clause extends to for-
eign-owned property abroad result in the filing of more claims? Perhaps.
But it seems unlikely that that number could be so much greater than the
number of claims filed when nobody knows-because so few pass through
the sieve of a prudential-standing doctrine exercised at the discretion of a
changing cohort of judges-what the merits of the claim actually are.
2. The Problem of "Exceptional" Litigation
The second concern implicates the current global fight against terror-
ism. If the arguments above have been persuasive, what are their limits? I
have already implicitly restricted the discussion by my frequent reference
to foreign citizens in or of nations at peace with the United States. It is not
the intention of this Article to address questions currently resolved under
international humanitarian law a.k.a. laws of war. And there already exists
an extensive body of law that describes the role of federal courts when
asked to resolve claims filed by citizens of states with which we are at war
or that truly implicate the conventional military actions or foreign rela-
tions of the United States.2 ' My inquiry has been limited to what might be
termed "unexceptional" litigation, the most obvious example of which is
the taking of private property for public use at a civilian government in-
stallation abroad.
The problem, of course, is that the line between unexceptional and ex-
ceptional civil litigation was blurred at the start of the twenty-first century.
There is no reason to think that clarity will be restored to that dividing line
any time soon. Would foreign citizens in or from nations allied with the
United States who allege that they have been abducted or tortured by
American officials acting abroad to fight the so-called War on Terror now
have standing to sue for their claimed constitutional injuries? 212 Consider a
211. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 7(b), 40 Stat. 411,417 (1917) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 7(b) (2006)); Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75 (1942) ("The
ancient rule against suits by resident alien enemies has survived only so far as necessary to prevent
use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which might hamper our own war efforts or give aid to the
enemy. This may be taken as the sound principle of the common law today.").
212. On his second full day in office, President Obama signed an Executive Order entitled
"Ensuring Lawful Interrogations" that revoked his predecessor's Executive Order 13,440. Exec.
Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009). President Bush's order set forth his admini-
stration's view of the domestic and international law that would apply to a "program of detention
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new hypothetical in which the alleged harm is to Zoya herself, not her
caf6:
U.S. officials believe that Zoya, a citizen and resident of a foreign nation
at peace with the United States, possesses important intelligence infor-
mation about a suspected imminent terrorist attack. Zoya is not
suspected of any crime and is not herself considered to be a threat to na-
tional security. Zoya is seized by American agents and sent to an allied
state for coercive interrogation by United States officials. Should Zoya
be entitled to damages for the deprivation of her liberty without due
process of law?
Zoya has no substantial voluntary connection to the United States. But she
has experienced a substantial involuntary connection-seizure of her per-
son abroad by American officials. Should the rule be the same for such a
Bivens action as for a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment? It is
black-letter law that the president of the United States "may not authorize
the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the
United States Government . . . that would violate the Constitution or any
statute of the United States. '213 To decide the Bivens claim, therefore, we
must know the extraterritorial application of the Constitution in this cir-
cumstance.214 To reach the merits, Zoya must establish standing to sue.
To frame the question properly, a certain inherent inequality should be
noted at the outset. Questions of standing do not inhibit the United States
when it seeks to expose foreign citizens abroad to liability under U.S.
criminal or civil laws for the simple reason that criminal and civil defen-
and interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency." Exec. Order 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg.
40,707, 40,708 (Jul. 24, 2007). It was a program of broad scope and reach. Id.
President Obama ordered the CIA to close "as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities
that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future." Exec. Order
No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 27, 2009). Tucked into the definition section of the order,
however, was a crucial exception. The order, by its terms, exempted from its sweep any facilities
"used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis." Id. at 4893. In other words, extraordi-
nary rendition was not a program covered by this executive order. Greg Miller, CIA Retains Power
to Abduct, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2009, at Al ("Obviously you need to preserve some tools-you still
have to go after the bad guys," said an Obama Administration official, speaking on condition of
anonymity when discussing the legal reasoning. "The legal advisors working on this looked at rendi-
tion. It is controversial in some circles and kicked up a big storm in Europe. But if done within
certain parameters, it is an acceptable practice.").
213. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a). The same applies to intelligence activities. See Exec. Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 8, 1981) ("Nothing in this Order shall be construed to
authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States."). The order
also prohibits human experimentation, assassination, and indirect participation in prohibited activi-
ties. Id.
214. Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit recently held, inter alia, that extraordinary rendition
is a "new context" that presents "special factors counseling hesitation" to extend a Bivens cause of
action, and declined to do so. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009). The future of this
holding is uncertain. The court was split 7-4, with strong dissents against this portion of the opinion.
The court was also deprived of the opinion of then-Judge Sotomayor, who participated in oral argu-
ment but was elevated to the Supreme Court before the appeal was decided. As of this writing, the
time for petitioning the Supreme Court for review on certiorari had not expired. See Sup. Ct. R.
13.1.
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dants are not plaintiffs (and thus need not demonstrate standing to sue). 2 11
Foreigners on foreign-flagged vessels in international waters may be1 16
hauled into American courts on drug charges. In fact, the criminal statute
expressly states that the person charged "does not have standing to raise a
claim of failure to comply with international law as a basis for a de-
fense.,,2 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez, "foreign nationals must abide by our laws even when in their
own countries," citing federal criminal, antitrust, and securities laws.28
Should the requirement that a would-be plaintiff have substantial vol-
untary connections to the United States in order to be heard in our courts
be a one-way ratchet applicable only to dismiss claims against the United
States but not an impediment to foreign application of our law? In an im-
portant article published eighteen years ago in the Yale Law Journal,
Gerald Neuman examined arguments about extraterritoriality in the imme-
diate aftermath of Verdugo-Urquidez and asked where the Constitution
could be said to "end., 2'9 He argued forcefully for extending constitutional
protections "to aliens outside United States territory only in those circum-
stances in which the United States seeks to impose obligations upon them
under United States law."
2 0
That public law answer to the challenge of Verdugo-Urquidez was a
powerful argument when the prior substantial-connections test was used to
determine the merits of a constitutional claim. But it is now incomplete in
a world in which Verdugo-Urquidez has been wrenched from its public law
foundations (where such a municipal-law approach might make sense) to
create a judicial gate-keeping power over private law matters. It now is
used to deny foreign plaintiffs access to American courts to complain not
of public law obligations imposed upon them under U.S. law, but of inju-
ries caused them by (as they seek to claim) unconstitutional state action.
The circularity of the substantial-connections approach is matched
only by its pointlessness: why deny a forum to litigants who possess con-
stitutional standing to argue that an American official has exceeded her
215. Although questions of standing do not inhibit such jurisdiction, questions of due process
may well place limits on the "extraterritorial application of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction,' as my
colleague Anthony Colangelo authoritatively details. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International
Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 121, 123, 162-65 (2007).
216. See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70507 (2006); see also
United States v. Garcia, 182 F App'x 873 (11 th Cir. 2006). This is permitted under what is known as
the "protective principle" in international law, which permits states to assert universal jurisdiction
over certain crimes. This law considers foreign-flagged vessels to be subject to U.S. jurisdiction if
the foreign government consents to or waives objection to enforcement of the statute against its
national. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(C).
217. 46 U.S.C. § 70505.
218. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Neuman, supra note 1.
220. Id. at 919. Or, as Neuman expresses the idea later in the article, "when the United States
asserts an alien's obligation to comply with American law, the alien is presumptively entitled pro
hac vice to all constitutional rights." Id. at 978.
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constitutional authority? Given the ample mechanisms available in law to
dismiss genuinely ill-founded claims, as well as claims that are deemed
contrary to constitutionally established preferences for nonjudicial resolu-
• 221
tion (such as the nonjusticiability of certain otherwise valid questions, or
222the application of a state-secrets exception, or perhaps the existence of
"special factors counselling hesitation" that would preclude a Bivens ac-
tion223), this approach should be rejected.
Return now to Zoya's hypothetical abduction to see how this might
play out. Zoya may well be able to draft a plausible complaint that meets
224the recently heightened pleading standards. With regard to allegations
against high-level officials, she might even manage to satisfy the require-
ments of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.225 If she can do that, there is little reason to
doubt that she could satisfactorily allege an actual injury, fairly traceable
to the defendant and redressible by the court. In other words, she would
have satisfied all that the Constitution and the rules of civil procedure re-
quire of her to access a federal court. Perhaps she could survive a motion
to dismiss her complaint on other justiciability grounds, such as for pre-
senting a political question. And, maybe-just maybe-Zoya's complaint
could pass unscathed through a government motion to dismiss based on
assertion of the state-secrets privilege.
Having evaded each pleading obstacle and cleared each hurdle to reach
an Article III court, can it really be that prudence dictates that Zoya's con-
stitutional claim should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and thus
never decided on its legal or factual merits? What is prudent about leaving
such an important constitutional issue perennially undecided?
There is also a practical benefit to requiring motions on all of these
other grounds (rather than the easier motion to dismiss for lack of a prior
substantial connection) that should not be overlooked. There is a benefit to
making the state prove its case. Not every action by the U.S. Government
abroad implicates the foreign relations of the United States in a way that a
court would understand the matter to sound as a political question, not a
judicial one. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez,
the constitutional value at stake was the "assurance of neutrality" in the
protection provided by a "neutral and detached magistrate" against gov-
226
ernmental action. No more and no less is provided by rejecting the prior
substantial-connections test of standing.
221. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (describing application of political question
doctrine to issues concerning foreign relations).
222. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (establishing state-secrets doctrine).
223. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573-81 (2d Cir. 2009).
224. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
225. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
226. 494 U.S. 259, 294-95 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting, in part, Justice Jackson's
opinion for the Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
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Judge Weinstein, in his Cardozo lecture, identified this benefit from a
different perspective: the transparency necessary to hold officials account-
able. In notes to his public lecture he wrote: "Expansion of this
door-closing doctrine has the secondary effect of violating one of the es-
sentials of our form of government: transparency .... If the people cannot
discover what is going on in our government through litigation, how can
they control officials?" '227
The benefits of this transparency are not just that the public might hear
allegations from plaintiffs (of varying degrees of credibility) against their
government for actions done in their name. Removing this prudential bar-
rier to decisions on the merits has a valuable effect on lawyers, especially
those advising or later representing the government defendant. As one
scholar noted in a context far removed from our current crises: "There is a
terrible tendency on the part of lawyers-including executive branch law-
yers-to equate the absence of standing to challenge some government
action with lawful authority to engage in such action .... Where there is
(and can be) no decisional law, there is thought to be no law.
' 228
Professor Kermit Roosevelt described this effect more starkly in re-
marks published from his Donahue Lecture at Suffolk University Law
School. Roosevelt described the infamous "torture memos" produced by
the Office of Legal Counsel in order to note the value in preventing strate-
gic behavior designed to avoid legal constraint in the interpretation of the
Constitution. These memoranda, like the selection of Guantdnamo Bay to
house detainees out of the (later proven to be mistaken) belief that this was
a place beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts, treat the Constitution "the
way aggressive lawyers treat the tax code, as an annoyance to be
evaded.'229 He continued:
Under this approach, the Constitution must be followed, if you cannot
figure out how to get around it, but is not of any normative significance.
Guantdnamo is also in fact much like a tax shelter, something created
solely to circumvent the law. But using clever constructs to avoid tax
liability is one thing; using them to evade the Constitution is another.
Constitutional prohibitions on brutal or shocking conduct reflect a moral
judgment that there are some tactics our government must refrain from
using on individuals. This moral judgment is not altered by the location
227. Weinstein, supra note 11, at 62. Although Judge Weinstein's remarks were focused on
defending "the People's" access to courts, his reasoning regarding transparency is equally applicable
to access by aliens with claims against the United States, for their suits will promote transparency
no less than suits by citizens. Criticizing the political question doctrine in remarks immediately
following his comments on standing, Judge Weinstein gave the example of his judicial experience in
the Agent Orange litigation brought by Vietnamese nationals. Rejecting the doctrine in that context,
even as to the rights of noncitizens, Judge Weinstein wrote: "'A categorical rule of non-justiciability
because of possible interference with executive power, even in times of war,' does not exist." Id. at
238.
228. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907,916
(1994).
229. Kermit Roosevelt Imi, Detention and Interrogation in the Post-9/1l World, 42 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2008).
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of such acts and eluding the reach of the prohibition does nothing to
make the conduct less offensive. Treating the Constitution like the tax
code disrespects it and to the extent that the Constitution is a charter of
American values, it disrespects those values."3
When there is little expectation that those directly affected by one's deci-
sions will be in a position to contest them, decisionmaking loses an
important constraint. That constraint is not diminished by the likelihood of
success on the merits. There is a value to that constraint even when the
ultimate outcome to a constitutional challenge will be a holding that the
constitutional clause in question finds no extraterritorial purchase whatso-
ever in the circumstances presented by the ultimately unsuccessful
plaintiff. Notice has been served. The public is aware (both the domestic
public, capable of a political response, and the foreign public, whose po-
litical influence is less direct but in some cases no less real). All of those
affected by the reach of the Constitution are better off for the development
of case law on the question by thoughtful judges considering the positions
of zealous advocates.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the substantial-connections test, and the pruden-
tial-standing analysis that rests on it, should be rejected. Removing this
judicially imposed filter will neither open floodgates of foreign litigation
nor deny the executive branch constitutional tools for the conduct of the
nation's foreign affairs and protection of national security.
Testing a plaintiff's prudential standing to sue on the basis of her prior
substantial connection to the United States promotes none of the values that
the judge-made doctrine of prudential standing was designed to serve. At its
best, prudential standing serves a valuable role in promoting judicial self-
restraint. But judicial reluctance to determine the constitutional rights of
litigants does not further those principles. Rather, it imprudently abdicates
an important judicial role in defining the limits of state power.
Such a test is also detached from any firm constitutional foundation.
One might view the Constitution as a document that governs a particular
territory, a particular people, or as a document that must be interpreted with
a certain pragmatism necessary to govern in a complex and dangerous
world. Assessing the prior substantial connection of foreign plaintiffs to the
United States does not cohere with any of those views. If anything, it ob-
scures them.
The question "When should the Constitution follow the flag?" is not as
simple a question to answer as it is to ask. Answers have always varied
based on who has asked the question, in what historical context it is asked,
and which clauses are considered for application abroad. The contingent
nature of the question might make categorical answers nearly impossible.
But whatever those answers might be, and this Article does not purport to
230. Id.
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say what they are, it is of paramount importance that a judicial forum re-
main open to those whose injuries make asking the question more than just
an academic exercise. A discretionary standing test that excludes those best
placed to ask this very question has no place in our republic.
Zoya alleged that she was injured by the United States. She therefore
sought her remedy in the courts of the country that she thought had injured
her. Her constitutional claim might have merit and it might not. But Zoya is
entitled to an answer beyond the one this prudential test of standing gives to
her: "We choose not to hear you." Whatever answer Zoya might expect from
courts in Uzbekistan, she should not hear that one from a court of the United
States.
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